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Abstract
This dissertation evaluates the dynamic effects of government policies in a small open developing economy with external debt and sovereign risk. It is divided into three distinct
chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 have a theoretical focus; they involve the developing of intertemporal optimizing models of a small open economy. In these chapters, we use the
representative-agent framework to derive dynamic macroeconomic effects of different policy
changes. Specifically, chapter 1 examines the effects of an investment tax credit or investment subsidy (ITC) in a small open economy with an external borrowing constraint. It is
shown that an increase in the rate of the ITC leads to an increase in the stock of foreign debt,
consumption, capital accumulation, and output in the long run. Moreover, our results show
that the accumulation of foreign debt exhibits non-monotonic adjustment. Particularly, an
increase in the ITC leads to a current account deficit followed by a surplus. Along with
this non-monotonicity, our model also explains the positive correlation between savings and
investment during the transitional periods. In chapter 2 we examine the effects of monetary
policy in a small open developing economy with cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint, which
borrows from an imperfect capital market. Monetary policy involves targeting the inflation
rate. Here, it is shown that an increase in the inflation rate leads to a decrease in the stock
of foreign debt. It also leads to a decrease in consumption, employment, capital accumulation, and output in the long run. Chapter 3 has an empirical focus. In this chapter, we
use the sign restrictions methodology proposed by Uhlig (2005) to identify inflation shocks
and analyze their effects on consumption, investment and foreign debt for six developing
countries. The identification procedure imposes sign restrictions on the impulse responses of
consumption and investment to an inflation shock. No restriction is imposed on the response
of external debt. The main findings are that, overall, an inflation shock leads to declines in
consumption, investment and the stock of foreign debt.
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Preface
Most developing countries have low standards of living and are characterized by high unemployment, low capital accumulation and low saving rates. To carry out their development
programs and also to finance their consumption expenditures, many of them depend on external borrowing. Typically, they rely on capital inflows from commercial banks and nonbank
financial institutions to finance their development programs. This has led to the accumulation of substantial external debts, with its attendant cost of debt servicing. Often times,
they default in their repayment commitments.
The growing external debt stimulates interest in the analysis of government policies.
Moreover, with more than seventy-five percent of the world’s population living in developing
countries, it is important for us to understand the prospects for economic development by
examining the effects of government policies in the face of the increasing reliance on external
debt. In this dissertation we examine the effects of government policies in a small open
developing economy with external debt and sovereign risk.
For far too long, macroeconomists have focused on a closed economy. However, with the
integration of the global economy vis-à-vis increased trade and capital flows, it has become
a realistic trend to model the macroeconomy in an open economy set up. Moreover, for
simplicity, many studies assume perfect capital mobility, by which the supply of debt to the
economy is perfectly elastic. This assumption is questionable for developing economies with
an external borrowing constraint and sovereign risk. In this dissertation we develop small
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open economy models that incorporate these realities.
To incorporate one of the most important characteristics of developing economies (apart
from having foreign debt), in chapters 1 and 2, we assume that the model economy faces
an upward sloping supply curve of debt. This observation was originally used by Bardhan
(1967). With this formulation, a small open developing economy can borrow only at a risk
premium (the marginal cost of debt). Thus, a country’s cost of borrowing is modeled to
be an increasing function of its debt to the rest of the world. The relationship has been
employed in different contexts by Bhandari, Haque, and Turnovsky (1990), Fisher (1995)
and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2007). In the present specification we scale the level of
indebtedness by the ability to service the debt, measured by the level of output. Thus, it is
assumed that the risk premium depends on debt-servicing ability.
Apart from capturing a realistic aspect of a developing economy, this upward sloping
supply curve of debt also helps us to endogenize the real interest rate faced by the domestic
economy. This is very important for our study. The optimizing model with time additive
preferences, when applied to a small open economy, encounters a technical problem of degenerating dynamics. For a well-defined steady state to exist (in a model without ongoing
growth), one should assume that the fixed rate of time preference is equal to the world rate of
interest. This restriction, in fact, poses a serious limitation for studying the dynamic effects
of government policies. By modeling interest rate endogenously, we overcome the problem
of degenerate dynamics (see Mohsin (2006) for a detailed exposition). Thus, we are able to
examine the dynamic effects of different government policies in an optimizing framework.
The dissertation is organized as follows. In chapters 1 and 2, we explicitly study the
dynamic effects of investment tax credit and monetary policy respectively, conduct numerical
exercises, and analyze the transitional adjustments of the major variables. In chapter 3, we
develop and estimate a structural vector autoregressive model to provide empirical support
for the results obtained in chapter 2.
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Chapter 1
The Effects of Investment Tax
Credit/Subsidy
1.1

Introduction

Investment is an important growth fundamental that increases the level of capital in an
economy. It also enhances labor productivity due to the complementarity between capital
and labor. Moreover, investment exerts considerable influence in the short-run business
cycle. Thus, countries that increase their investment efforts are bound to experience faster
growth. The case has been made that in the long run it is not trade but investment that
leads to faster economic growth and integration in the world economy. Accounting on the
average for about one-sixth of gross national product, investment is also the most volatile
component of output.
But taxes are known to generally create disincentives towards the accumulation of capital. Because it increases the effective cost of capital, taxes have a negative impact on the
investment behavior of firms. Taxes are also known to cause large international mobility of
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capital. Thus, lowering taxes will reduce the cost of production and make firms competitive in international trade. This first chapter of the dissertation will study the effects of an
investment tax credit/subsidy.
Countries routinely try to attract investments through tax credits, exemptions or subsidies. Investment tax credits have been widely used in fiscal policy formulation to stimulate
investment and economic growth around the world. In the United States, for instance, the
government introduced a 7 percent ITC on equipment purchases in the early sixties to reduce
the effective cost of investment. It was repealed and reinstated on a number of occasions
until it was finally eliminated in 1986 by the tax reform act. ITCs have also been or continue to be employed in many OECD countries as well as in developing economies. It is an
undeniable fact that much of East Asia’s phenomenal growth was driven by physical investment. In the process, in South Korea and Taiwan, the governments promoted investment
by offering subsidies and tax incentives amongst others. In Singapore too, economic growth
was predicated on an investment strategy, except that the focus there was on incentives to
foreign investors.
An investment tax credit (or investment subsidy) is a policy that permits firms to reduce their tax liability by an amount equal to a certain fraction of their capital investment
expenditures. In this way the credit reduces the effective cost of capital. Unlike a statutory
reduction in the tax rate that reduces tax revenues from existing investment, an ITC only
reduces the tax burden of new investment. Also, an ITC applies only to equipment investment (and not to other forms of physical capital such as structures). In addition, it does
not permit benefits to existing capital stock; it does so to the replacement of an asset as it
wears away. Moreover, residential fixed investments are not eligible for ITC.
However, the use of investment subsidies has been a major source of disagreement among
economists and policymakers. Proponents of the ITC claim that capital income tax has
a negative effect on savings, and that reduced savings, ultimately lead to lower economic
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output. An ITC program, they argue, offers a variety of benefits to taxpayers who invest
in equipment. This innovative program lowers the cost of capital, boosts investment, and
stimulates economic growth. Thus, it effectively reduces the price of capital goods to firms
without changing the returns from such capital. This view is supported by Abel (1982), Brock
(1988), Sen and Turnovsky (1989), Nielsen and Sorensen (1991). Moreover, supporters argue
that as opposed to rate cuts, ITCs yield lower revenue loss since they do not lower the tax
on the existing stock of capital. Bovenberg and Goulder (1995) use a numerical simulation
method in a disaggregated general equilibrium model to document that ITCs produce greater
efficiency gains than corporate income tax cuts. In addition, ITCs have been used as a
countercyclical stimulus. They can also be used to rectify part of the efficiency loss from the
distortionary effects of capital income taxation.
But some previous researches give conflicting results on the ITC’s success in encouraging
investment. Pereira (1994) finds that ITCs have adverse effects on investment and output.
In another study, Auerbach and Summers (1979) use a macroeconometric model to observe
that in the long-run ITCs are unlikely to increase the capital stock. Critics of the ITC
also argue that it causes economic distortions across assets and across industries where any
did not exist previously. Using a disaggregated dynamic general equilibrium model of the
U.S. economy to measure the overall efficiency effects of ITCs, Pereira (1994) observes that
ITCs are distortionary. Furthermore, opponents of the investment subsidy say that it is not
neutral; it favors short-lived assets. Besides, it does little to reduce the distortions in the
allocation of capital among assets that depreciate. Auerbach and Summers (1979) do not
find enough evidence that the ITC is an effective fiscal policy tool.
Despite the drawbacks to the ITC, there is a great deal of support among policymakers
and economists for the granting of direct investment subsidies. Meyer, Prakken and Varves
(1993) show empirically that well specified ITCs have a greater ”bang for the buck”. Goolsbee
(2003) finds that a 10 percent increase in ITC raises the relative wage of capital goods workers
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substantially in relation to workers in comparable sectors. Also, Auerbach (1987) observes
that the distortions of an ITC are still not large relative to other tax-induced distortions.
Some of the earlier studies outlined above are based on partial equilibrium analysis. For
instance, in using a “Tobin’s q“ model of investment, Abel (1982) fails to examine equilibrium
conditions in other markets. The general equilibrium studies of Sen and Turnovsky (1989),
Goulder and Summers (1989), Brock (1988), and Nielsen and Sorensen (1991), amongst
others assume that an economy borrows or lends freely at the existing world interest rate in
a perfect capital market. However, this assumption might not be realistic for a small open
economy with an external borrowing constraint and sovereign risk. Because of the high risk
of default with such economies, it is often assumed that the cost of borrowing is an increasing
function of the stock of debt.
This study incorporates this idea by setting up a model of a small open economy that
faces an upward sloping supply curve of debt. This concept was originally proposed by
Bardhan (1967). The relationship has been employed by Obstfeld (1982), Bhandari, Haque,
and Turnovsky (1990), Fisher (1995) to address various policy issues. Here, the interest rate
is modeled as an increasing function of the economy’s total debt. In the present specification
we scale the level of indebtedness by the ability to service the debt, measured by the level of
output. Thus, it is assumed that the risk premium depends on debt-servicing ability. This
changes the equilibrium structure greatly since the equality between the domestic rate of time
preference and the effective interest rate will not pose a problem of degenerate dynamics.
Moreover, this modeling feature enables us to study the dynamic effects of fiscal policy. The
duration of an ITC affects how much it can stimulate economic growth. Evidence suggests
that firms respond more to a permanent ITC than to a temporary one, Brock (1988). This
explains in part why ITCs have been a permanent feature in the developmental programs
of many developing countries. Thus, we analyze the effects of an unanticipated permanent
ITC.
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The growing subsidization of investment expenditures by firms stimulates interest in the
theoretical analysis of ITC in small open developing countries. However, to date, the effects
of ITC in small open developing countries have not been studied theoretically. The present
paper addresses that need by using an intertemporal general equilibrium model of a small
open economy with external debt and sovereign risk to study the dynamic and steady state
effects of an ITC. We examine the effects on important macroeconomic aggregates such as
consumption, investment, employment, and the stock of foreign debt.
Immediately after an increase in the ITC, consumption expenditures fall due to an income
effect. Since the ITC is financed by lump sum taxes, we observe the instant fall in aggregate
consumption. However, the steady state effect on consumption is positive. This is because
during the transitional period the income level of the household increases through production
(profits) as well as wages, which helps aggregate consumption to grow. Also, on impact,
there is a substantial fall in leisure thereby increasing labor supply. After the initial jump,
employment continues growing for a while before it starts declining to reach steady state.
The initial jump in employment actually increases the marginal productivity of capital.
Unanticipated permanent increase in the ITC lowers the long run value of ”Tobin’s q” (the
shadow price of capital) making investment more attractive for the firm. With adjustment
costs of investment, capital adjusts slowly toward its long run level.
The adjustments of all the major variables are non-monotonic in nature. Even though
capital increases throughout the transitional period, the initial growth rate of investment
is higher than it is during the later part of the adjustment period. The change in the
level of output during the transitional period is captured by the behavior of employment
and investment. As a result, we observe instant increases in output due to an increase in
employment in the short run. After the initial jump, the output level continues to increase
until the economy reaches its steady state. However, the growth rate of output is higher
during the initial transitional period.
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One of the most important results is the effect on the accumulation of foreign debt.
Higher investment tax credit leads to a higher level of foreign debt in the long run. This is
due to increased level of output in the economy. In truth, in the steady state, both output
and foreign debt must grow proportionately. We observe non-monotonic adjustment of the
accumulation of foreign debt; initial increase followed by gradual decline. Since the negative
of foreign debt measures the current account position of the economy, we can claim that
the current account balance of the economy exhibits a non-monotonic adjustment due to
a permanent shock in the investment tax credit. The rest of the chapter is organized as
follows. The model with inelastic labor is presented in section 1.2. Section 1.3 studies the
effects of an ITC in a complete model with elastic labor, while the main conclusions are
given in section 1.4.

1.2

The Model With Inelastic Labor

We first develop a simple model with fixed employment in which output is produced with
only capital. Since the full-blown model will be complicated, a simplified model will give us
a better understanding of the dynamics involved. The model is that of a small open economy
that produces a single traded good. It comprises three key sectors: households, firms, and the
government. The economy is inhabited by a large number of identical households and firms.
Domestic firms are owned by households, to whom profits accrue. In addition, the agent may
accumulate debts, b, which are borrowed in the international financial market. We assume
imperfect capital mobility. The small economy faces an effective interest rate, r̃, which is
the sum of a fixed world interest rate, r∗ and a risk premium. The risk premium depends
on debt-servicing ability. Hence, the upward-sloping supply curve of debt is expressed as


∗

r̃t = r + Z
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bt
f (kt )


,

(1.1)

where, r̃t is the interest rate charged on foreign debt, bt , r∗ is the world interest rate, and
Z(.) is the country-specific risk premium. Z is a convex function, capturing the possibility
of a debt cutoff. We proceed by considering the problem facing each sector in turn.

1.2.1

The Representative Household

The representative household is assumed to have an infinite planning horizon, faces imperfect
capital markets, and has perfect foresight of the future. There is no uncertainty in this model.
The household chooses his/her private rate of consumption of the traded good, ct , in order
to maximize the present value of lifetime utility, U, as given by:
Z
U=

∞

u(ct )e−βt dt,

(1.2)

0

where β, the rate of time preference is assumed to be strictly positive. The utility function
is assumed to be concave; Uc > 0, Ucc < 0. The flow budget constraint of the household is
given by:

ḃ = c + T + r̃b − π,

(1.3)

where π is the real profit (dividend) received by the representative household, and T denotes
lump-sum taxes. Income is thus the sum of profits, which is allocated to consumption, tax
payment and debt repayment1 . Equation (1.3) implies that the agent will accumulate debts
to the extent that his/her total expenditure exceeds his/her total income.
The representative household’s problem therefore is to maximize equation (1.2), subject
to (1.3), and the initial condition, b (0) = b0 . The current value Hamiltonian for the agent’s
problem may thus be written as:
1

A dot above a variable denotes a time derivative. Time subscripts are omitted for convenience.
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H = U (c) + µ [c + T + r̃b − π]

(1.4)

where µ, the co-state variable associated with (1.3), is the marginal utility of wealth (or the
marginal utility of reducing debt for a borrower). Since the economy is small, in making
his/her decisions, the representative consumer takes π and T as given. Optimizing equation
(1.4) leads to the following first-order optimality conditions:

U 0 (c) = µ,

(1.5.1)

µ̇ = µ (β − r̃) ,

(1.5.2)

and the standard transversality condition limt→∞ e−βt µt bt = 0. Equation (1.5.1) says that at
the optimum, the representative household equates his/her marginal cost of saving one unit
in the current period to the marginal benefit he/she receives in the future. Equation (1.5.2)
shows how the marginal utility of wealth evolves over time.

1.2.2

The Representative Firm

The representative firm produces output with a neoclassical production function with capital
as the only input, i.e. y = f (k); fk > 0, fkk < 0. In this model, we assume that expenditure
on any given investment is an increasing function of the rate of capital accumulation. Since
there is cost to installing capital, investment involves adjustment costs given by the function:

Φ(I) = (1 − τ )I + Ψ(I),

(1.6)

where Φ(I) is the total cost associated with the purchase of I units of new capital, τ is the
rate of investment tax credit (or investment subsidy) at time t, and Ψ(I) are the adjustment
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costs associated with I.2 The function Ψ(I) is assumed to be a nonnegative, convex function,
with Φ0 ≥ 0; Φ00 > 0. In addition, we may set Ψ(0) = 0 and Ψ0 (0) = 0, which means that
the cost of zero investment is zero, Φ(0) = 0 and the marginal cost of initial investment is
unity, Φ0 (0) = 1 (See Hayashi, 1982). Profits net of investment expenditure at time t for the
firm is given by the relation:

π = f (k) − (1 − τ )I − Ψ(I).

(1.7)

The firm’s problem is to maximize the present value of its lifetime dividend (output less
total cost of investment):
Z

∞
−

πe
0

Rt
0

r̃v dv

Z
dt =

∞

[f (k) − (1 − τ )I − Ψ(I)]e−

Rt
0

r̃v dv

dt.

(1.8)

0

subject to the constraint that the rate of capital accumulation and investment are related
as follows:

k̇ = I,

(1.9)

and the initial condition k(0) = k0 , where for simplicity we assume that there is no depreciation of capital. Moreover, the firm is assumed to finance investment purely from retained
earnings and therefore does not need to borrow. The current value Hamiltonian for the firm’s
problem is

H = f (k) − (1 − τ )I − Ψ(I) + qI,

(1.10)

where q, the co-state variable associated with the state variable k, is the shadow price of
capital (or Tobin’s q). The first-order optimality conditions for this problem with respect to
2

There are no corporate taxes in the model. Agents are allowed to credit a fraction of their investment
expenditures, τ against their income tax payments.
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I and k are respectively:

(1 − τ ) + Ψ0 (I) = q,

(1.11.1)

q̇ = qr̃ − fk ,

(1.11.2)

and the transversality condition limt→∞ qt kt e−

Rt
0

r̃v dv

= 0, which must hold in order for the

agent to satisfy his/her intertemporal budget constraint. Equation (1.11.1) asserts that the
sum of the value of the investment subsidy and the marginal cost of investment must equal
the shadow price of capital. Rewriting equation (1.11.2) yields the intertemporal arbitrage
relationship, which implies that the rate of return on domestic capital must equal the rate
of return on the foreign debt payment.

1.2.3

The Government

We abstract from money and monetary policies, and focus entirely on the fiscal side of the
government. In examining the effects of ITC, we assume that the government balances its
budget at each point in time according to the following condition:

T = τI

(1.12)

Equation (1.12) implies that the government redistributes income by levying the real lump
sum tax, T and using it to provide investment subsidy, (τ I). By combining equations (1.3),
(1.7), and (1.12) we obtain the debt accumulation equation, which is the negative of the
current account balance:

ḃ = r̃b + c + Φ(I) − f (k)
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(1.13)

Thus, the current account balance reflects the balance between domestic income and absorption.

1.2.4

Equilibrium Dynamics

By combining all the optimality conditions derived from the household and firms sectors,
together with the flow budget constraints, the macroeconomic equilibrium can be described
by the following set of equations:

U 0 (c) = µ,





∗

µ̇ = µ β − r − Z



∗

(1.14.1)

b
f (k)


,

(1.14.2)

q = (1 − τ ) + Ψ0 (I),

(1.14.3)

k̇ = I,

(1.14.4)

q̇ = qr̃ − fk (k),

(1.14.5)

ḃ = r + Z



b
f (k)


b + c + Φ(I) − f (k).

(1.14.6)

It should be noted that we can solve equations (1.14.1) and (1.14.3) for c and I as follows:

c = c(µ)
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(1.15.1)

I = I(q, τ ).

(1.15.2)

The partial derivatives of consumption demand and investment implicit in Equations (1.15.1)
and (1.15.2) are found by differentiating (1.14.1) with respect to µ and (1.14.3) with respect
to q and τ. This gives:

cµ =

1
U 00 (c)

Iq = Iτ =

<0

(1.16.1)

1
>0
Ψ00

(1.16.2)

The partial derivatives can be explained as follows. Because of the consumption-leisure
trade-off, ceteris paribus, an increase in the marginal utility of wealth, µ, causes a decrease
in consumption. Similarly, holding everything else constant, an increase in the marginal
utility of capital q, or an increase in the rate of the investment subsidy raises the level of
investment in the economy.
We are now in a position to analyze the dynamics of the model. The dynamic behavior
of the economy is determined by the following system of differential equations, (1.17.1) (1.17.4). Noting that c = c(µ), and I = I(q, τ ),


∗



ḃ = r + Z

b
f (k)




b + c(µ) + Φ(I(q)) − f (k)

∗



µ̇ = µ β − r − Z

k̇ = I(q, τ )
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b
f (k)

(1.17.1)


(1.17.2)

(1.17.3)



∗

q̇ = q r + Z



b
f (k)


− fk (k)

(1.17.4)

Under the assumption of a balanced budget the dynamic structure of the system (1.17) is
a fourth order system, which may be expressed in linearized form about the steady-state
equilibrium (the upper bar denotes the steady state values):


 
ḃ
  
  
 µ̇  
  
 =
 k̇  
  
  
q̇

where a11

a23


a11 a12 a13 a14  


a21 0 a23 0 



0
0
0 a34 


a41 0 a43 a44


b − b̄ 

µ − µ̄ 


k − k̄ 


q − q̄

(1.18)

 2 0

b Z fk
µZ 0
bZ 0
0
, a12 = cµ , a13 = −
+
f
,
,
a
=
I
(q),
a
=
−
= r̃ +
k
14
21
f
f2
f

 0

0
µZ 0 bfk
qZ
bf
qZ
k
=
, a34 = I 0 (q), a41 =
, a43 = −
+ fkk , and a44 = β.
f2
f
f2
All elements of the coefficient matrix are evaluated at their steady state values. The

system has two negative and two positive eigenvalues, meaning the equilibrium is saddlepoint
stable.3 Under saddlepoint stability, we shall assume that the marginal utility of wealth µ,
and shadow price of capital q respond to shocks instantaneously, while the stock variables k
and b evolve away gradually. Dynamic analysis of this fourth order system is complicated.
Thus, it precludes the use of phase diagrams. The detailed dynamic paths involving these
values will be derived in the next part, where we will deal with the full-blown model.
3

Let the eigenvalues be denoted by λ1 , λ2 , λ3 , and λ4 . We can show that the determinant and the trace
are both positive, indicating that there are either two positive (and two negative) roots or four positive (and
no negative) eigenvalues. Moreover, the sum of (λ1 λ2 λ3 + λ1 λ2 λ4 + λ1 λ3 λ4 + λ2 λ3 λ4 ) is negative. This rules
out the possibility of four positive roots.

13

1.2.5

Steady State Effects

In this subsection we examine the impact of an unanticipated and permanent increase in
ITC on steady state levels of the variables. At the steady state µ̇ = q̇ = k̇ = ḃ = 0. Thus,

U 0 (c̄) = µ̄,



∗

β =r +Z

(1.19.1)

b̄
f (k̄)


,

(1.19.2)

q̄ = 1 − τ,



∗



(1.19.3)

b̄
f (k̄)


,

(1.19.4)




b̄
∗
b̄ + c̄
f (k̄) = r + Z
f (k̄)

(1.19.5)

fk (k̄, ) = q̄ r + Z

These equations jointly determine the steady state equilibrium values of consumption c̄,
capital stock k̄, debt accumulation b̄, marginal utility of wealth µ̄, and the shadow price
of capital q̄. The steady state effects of an increase in investment subsidy, obtained by
differentiating the long-run equilibrium, i.e., equations (1.19.1) - (1.19.5) with respect to τ
are as follows:
dq̄
= −1,
dτ

(1.20)

dk̄
r̃
=−
> 0,
dτ
fkk

(1.21)
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db̄
br̃fk
=−
> 0,
dτ
f fkk

(1.22)

U 00 r̃fk (f − r̃b)
dµ̄
=−
<0
dτ
f fkk

(1.23)

dc̄
r̃fk (f − r̃b)
=−
>0
dτ
f fkk

(1.24)

The steady state effects show that an increase in the rate of an investment subsidy will
increase the long-run stock of capital, foreign debt, consumption, and output. The results
can be explained as follows. An increase in τ increases the effective rate of return from
investment and thus stimulates the formation of capital in the economy, leading to a rise
in the steady state level of the capital stock. In other words, by reducing the effective cost
of capital, the investment subsidy encourages investment. Since output is solely determined
by the level of capital, it is natural that the level of output goes up in the long run as well.
Higher level of permanent income (wealth) obviously lowers the marginal utility of wealth.
This wealth effect also enhances the level of consumption in the long run. In this developing
economy too, higher income improves creditworthiness. Since the economy is constrained by
the upward supply curve of debt, the economy actually enjoys lower effective rate of interest
on external borrowing during the transitional periods. Hence, it is not surprising that the
economy on net accumulates more foreign debt in the long run due to this fiscal shock. It
should also be noted that the debt-income ratio will remain unchanged in the steady states.
From y = f (k), we can also show that
dȳ
dk̄
= fk
>0
dτ
dτ
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(1.25)

In the long run, the effect of the ITC on the ratio of the market value to the replacement
cost of capital (Tobin’s q) is negative. This is because τ reduces the effective cost of new
capital, making new capital cheaper than old capital. These results support the conventional
argument that ITCs stimulate investment and GDP growth.

1.3

The Model With Endogenous Labor Supply

After setting up the simple, yet effective model we refine our model to incorporate endogenous
labor supply and thus develop a complete model. In this model, since labor supply is
endogenous, employment and wages are not fixed. Overall, the model changes significantly.
First of all, the effective interest rate for the developing economy, r̃, is given as


∗

r̃ = r + Z

b
f (k, l)


.

(1.26)

Here again, we proceed by considering the problem facing each sector in turn.

1.3.1

The Representative Household

The representative household chooses his private rate of consumption of the traded good, c,
and labor supply, l in order to maximize the present value of lifetime utility, U, as given by:
Z
U=

∞

u(ct, lt )e−βt dt,

(1.27)

0

where β, the rate of time preference (or subjective discount rate) is assumed to be strictly
positive. The utility function is assumed to be additively separable over time in c and l; i.e.
u (c, l) = U (c)+V (l), with U 0 (c) > 0, U 00 (c) < 0, V 0 (l) < 0 and V 00 (l) < 0. It must be noted
that a household has one unit of time every period that can be used to provide labor l or
16

for leisure 1 − l. Thus, the representative agent derives positive, but diminishing, marginal
utility from the consumption of the good. He/she also derives positive, but diminishing,
marginal utility from leisure. The household’s flow budget constraint is given by:

ḃ = c + T + r̃b − wl − π,

(1.28)

where π is the real profit received by the representative household, w is the real wage rate,
and T is lump-sum tax.
The representative household’s problem therefore is to maximize equation (1.27) subject
to (1.28), and the initial condition, b (0) = b0 . The current-value Hamiltonian for the agent’s
problem may be written as:

H = U (c) + V (l) + µ [c + T + r̃b − wl − π]

(1.29)

Optimizing equation (1.29) leads to the following first-order optimality conditions:

U 0 (c) = µ,

(1.30.1)

V 0 (lt ) = −µw,

(1.30.2)

µ̇ = µ (β − r̃) ,

(1.30.3)

and the standard transversality condition limt→∞ e−βt µt bt = 0. Equation (1.30.1) says that
at the optimum, the representative household equates his/her marginal cost of saving one
unit in the current period to the marginal benefit he/she receives in the future. Equation
(1.30.2) equates the marginal disutility of labor to the real wage valued at the shadow value
of wealth, while equation (1.30.3) shows how the marginal utility of wealth evolves.
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1.3.2

The Representative Firm

The representative firm produces output with a neoclassical production function, i.e. y =
f (k, l): fk > 0, fl > 0, fkk < 0, fll < 0. F (k, l) is also assumed to be linearly homogeneous in
capital and labor, i.e., fkk fll − fkl2 = 0, fkl > 0. With adjustment costs of investment, profits
net of investment expenditure at time t for the firm is given by the relation:

π = f (k, l) − wl − (1 − τ )I − Ψ(I).

(1.31)

The firm’s problem is to maximize the present value of its dividend (output less wages and
total cost of investment):
Z

∞
−

πe

Rt
0

r̃v dv

Z
dt =

0

∞

[f (k, l) − wl − (1 − τ )I − Ψ(I)]e−

Rt
0

r̃v dv

dt,

(1.32)

0

subject to the constraint that the rate of capital accumulation and investment are related
as follows:

k̇ = I,

(1.33)

and the initial condition k(0) = k0 . Moreover, the firm is assumed to finance investment
purely from retained earnings and therefore does not need to borrow. The current value
Hamiltonian for the firm’s problem is

H = f (k, l) − wl − (1 − τ )I − Ψ(I) + qI,

(1.34)

where q, the co-state variable associated with the state variable k, is the shadow price of
capital (or Tobin’s q). The first-order optimality conditions for this problem with respect to
l, I, and k are, respectively:
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fl (k, l) = w,

(1.35.1)

(1 − τ ) + Ψ0 (I) = q,

(1.35.2)

q̇ = qr̃ − fk (k, l),

(1.35.3)

and the transversality condition limt→∞ qt kt e−

Rt
0

r̃v dv

= 0. Equation (1.35.1) implies that un-

der profit maximization, the marginal product of labor must equal the real wage. Equation
(1.35.2) asserts that the sum of the value of the investment subsidy and the marginal cost of
investment must equal the shadow price of capital. Rewriting (1.35.3) yields the intertemporal arbitrage relationship, which implies that the rate of return on domestic capital must
equal the rate of return on the foreign bond.

1.3.3

The Government

In examining the effects of ITC, we assume that the government balances its budget at
each point in time. By combining equations (1.28), (1.31), and (1.12) we obtain the debt
accumulation equation, which is the negative of the current account balance:

ḃ = r̃b + c + Φ(I) − f (k, l)

1.3.4

(1.36)

Equilibrium Dynamics

By combining all the optimality conditions derived from the household and firms sectors,
together with the flow budget constraints, equilibrium can be described by the following set
of equations:
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U 0 (c) = µ,

(1.37.1)

V 0 (l) = −µfl (k, l),

(1.37.2)





∗

µ̇ = µ β − r − Z



∗

ḃ = r + Z

b
f (k, l)


,

(1.37.3)

q = (1 − τ ) + Ψ0 (I),

(1.37.4)

k̇ = I,

(1.37.5)

q̇ = qr̃ − fk (k, l),

(1.37.6)



b
f (k, l)


b + c + Φ(I) − f (k, l).

(1.37.7)

It should be noted from (1.37.1), (1.37.2) and (1.37.4) that the equilibrium levels of c, l and
I can be represented by the following equations:

c = c(µ)

(1.38.1)

l = l(µ, k)

(1.38.2)
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I = I(q, τ ).

(1.38.3)

The partial derivatives of consumption demand, labor supply and investment implicit in
equations (1.38.1), (1.38.2) and (1.38.3) are found by differentiating (1.37.1) with respect to
µ, (1.37.2) with respect to µ and k, and (1.37.4) with respect to q and τ. This gives:

cµ =

lµ = −

lk = −

1
U 00 (c)

<0

V

fl (k, l)
00 (l) + µf

V

00 (l)

(1.39.1)

>0

(1.39.2)

µflk
>0
+ µfll

(1.39.3)

1
>0
Ψ00

(1.39.4)

Iq = Iτ =

ll

The partial derivatives can be explained as follows. Equation (1.39.1) implies that, everything else constant, an increase in the marginal utility of wealth, µ, causes a decrease in
consumption. According to equation (1.39.2), when the marginal utility of wealth increases
(wealth decreases), keeping all other variables unchanged, the household is likely to consume
less leisure, and increase his labor supply. Also, equation (1.39.3) says that, everything else
constant, an increase in the capital stock, k, by raising the real wage leads to a substitution of work for consumption. Equation (1.39.4) says that an increase in Tobin’s q, ceteris
paribus, causes an increase in the return from investment, thereby increasing investment.
Similarly, all else constant, an increase in the rate of the ITC reduces the effective rental
rate on capital, thereby causing investment to rise.
We are now in a position to analyze the dynamics of the model. The dynamic behavior of
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the economy is determined by the system of differential equations, (1.40.1) - (1.40.4). Noting
that c = c(µ), l = l(µ, k), and I = I(q, τ ), we obtain:


∗

ḃ = r + Z



b
f (k, l(µ, k))


b + c(µ) + Φ(I(q, τ )) − f (k, l(µ, k))



∗



µ̇ = µ β − r − Z

b
f (k, l(µ, k))


(1.40.2)

k̇ = I(q, τ )





∗

q̇ = q r + Z

b
f (k, l(µ, k))

(1.40.1)

(1.40.3)


− fk (k, l(µ, k))

(1.40.4)

Under the assumption of a balanced budget the dynamic structure of the system (1.40) is
a fourth order system, which may be expressed in linearized form about the steady-state
equilibrium (the upper bar denotes the steady state values):






 ḃ   a11 a12 a13 a14
  
 µ̇   a21 a22 a23 0
  
 =
 k̇   0
0
0 a34
  
  
a41 a42 a43 a44
q̇

where a11





  b − b̄ 


  µ − µ̄ 




  k − k̄ 




q − q̄





bZ 0
b2 Z 0
= r̃ +
, a12 = cµ − 1 + 2 fl lµ ,
f
f

a13



b2 Z 0
µZ 0
µZ 0 bfl lµ
= − 1 + 2 (fk + fl lk ) , a14 = I 0 (q), a21 = −
, a22 =
,
f
f
f2

a23

µZ 0 b
qZ 0
0
= 2 (fk + fl lk ), a34 = I (q), a41 =
, a42 = −
f
f
22




qZ 0 bfl lµ
+ fkl lµ ,
f2

(1.41)


qZ 0 b
=−
(fk + fl lk ) + (fkk + fkl lk) , and a44 = β.
f2


a43

All elements of the coefficient matrix are evaluated at their steady state values. Unlike
the system (1.18), we are unable to prove analytically that there are two negative and
two positive roots. However, we show the existence of an equilibrium numerically. The
detail discussion is given in section 1.3.5.2. The system has two negative and two positive
eigenvalues, meaning the equilibrium is saddlepoint stable. Under saddlepoint stability, we
shall assume that the marginal utility of wealth µ, and shadow price of capital q respond to
shocks instantaneously, while the stock variables k and b evolve away gradually. As stated
earlier, dynamic analysis of this fourth order system is too complicated to obtain phase
diagrams. However, the mathematical derivatives of the optimal path are derived as follows:
Let the eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix in (1.18 or 1.41) be denoted by ξ1 , ξ2 , ξ3 ,
and ξ4 .

Suppose ξ1 and ξ2 are negative, while ξ3 and ξ4 are positive.

Also, suppose

(νi1 , νi2 , ν13 , ν14 ) is the eigenvector associated with ξi , ∀ i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Then we can write






 bt − b̄  

 
 µt − µ̄  

 

=
 k − k̄  
 t
 

 
qt − q̄



ν11 ν21 ν31 ν41  


ν12 ν22 ν32 ν42 



ν13 ν23 ν33 ν43 


ν14 ν24 ν34 ν44

A1 e

ξ1 t

A2 eξ2 t
A3 e

ξ3 t

A4 eξ4 t











(1.42)

where A1 , A2 , A3 and A4 are the coefficients yet to be determined. It should be noted that
b and k are predetermined variables. For the solution to be bounded we set A3 = A4 = 0.
Hence, we can write the following:

bt − b̄ = ν11 A1 eξ1 t + ν21 A2 eξ2 t

23

(1.43.1)

kt − k̄ = ν13 A1 eξ1 t + ν23 A2 eξ2 t

(1.43.2)

Assuming that at time t = 0 we have b = b0 and k = k0 , we can solve (1.41.1) and
(1.41.2) for A1 and A2 to obtain equations for the saddle path as follows:

bt − b̄ = (b0 − b̄)(B1 eξ1 t + B2 eξ2 t ) + (k0 − k̄)(B3 eξ1 t + B4 eξ2 t ),

(1.44.1)

kt − k̄ = (b0 − b̄)(B5 eξ1 t + B6 eξ2 t ) + (k0 − k̄)(B7 eξ1 t + B8 eξ2 t ),

(1.44.2)

µt − µ̄ = (b0 − b̄)(B9 eξ1 t + B10 eξ2 t ) + (k0 − k̄)(B11 eξ1 t + B12 eξ2 t ),

(1.44.3)

qt − q̄ = (b0 − b̄)(B13 eξ1 t + B14 eξ2 t ) + (k0 − k̄)(B15 eξ1 t + B16 eξ2 t ),

(1.44.4)

where Bi is given as
B1 =

−ν21 ν13
−ν11 ν21
ν21 ν11
ν11 ν23
, B2 =
, B3 =
, B4 =
,
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21

B5 =

−ν23 ν13
−ν21 ν13
ν23 ν11
ν23 ν13
, B6 =
, B7 =
, B8 =
,
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21

B9 =

ν12 ν23
−ν22 ν13
−ν11 ν21
ν21 ν11
, B10 =
, B11 =
, B12 =
,
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21

B13 =

ν14 ν23
−ν24 ν13
−ν21 ν14
ν24 ν11
, B14 =
, B15 =
, B16 =
.
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21

This completes the basic description of the model. Now we will evaluate the model to
examine the effects of investment tax credit/subsidy.
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1.3.5

The Effects of an Investment Tax Credit/Subsidy

In this section we analyze the long run effects of a permanent ITC, conduct a numerical
evaluation, and discuss the transitional adjustments of the variables.

Steady State Effects
First, we examine the impact of an unanticipated and permanent increase in ITC on steady
state levels of the variables. At the steady state µ̇ = q̇ = k̇ = ḃ = 0. Thus,

U 0 (c̄) = µ̄,

(1.45.1)


V 0 ¯l = −µ̄fl (k̄, ¯l),

(1.45.2)



∗

β =r +Z

b̄
f (k̄, ¯l)


,

(1.45.3)

q̄ = 1 − τ,



∗
¯
fk (k̄, l) = q r + Z



f (k̄, ¯l) = r + Z
∗



(1.45.4)

b̄
f (k̄, ¯l)

b̄
f (k̄, ¯l)


,

(1.45.5)


b̄ + c̄.

(1.45.6)

These equations jointly determine the steady state equilibrium values of consumption c̄,
labor supply ¯l, capital stock k̄, debt accumulation b̄, marginal utility of wealth µ̄, and the
shadow price of capital q̄. The steady state effects of an increase in investment subsidy,
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obtained by differentiating the long-run equilibrium, i.e., equations (1.45.1) - (1.45.6) with
respect to τ are as follows:
dq̄
= −1,
dτ

(1.46)

r̃ [f 2 U 00 (f − r̃b) + f (V 00 + µfll )]
dk̄
=− l
> 0,
dτ
D

(1.47)

d¯l
r̃[fk fl U 00 (f − r̃b) + µflk f ]
=
= 0,
dτ
D

(1.48)

db̄
br̃[µfll fk + V 00 fk − µfkl fl )
=−
> 0,
dτ
D

(1.49)

dµ̄
U 00 r̃[µflk fl (f − r̃b) − µfll fk (f − rb) − V 00 fk (f − rb)]
=
<0
dτ
D

(1.50)

dc̄
r̃[µfkl fl (f − r̃b) − µfll fk (f − r̃b) − V 00 fk (f − r̃b)
=
>0
dτ
D

(1.51)

where D = U 00 (r̃b − f )(flk fk fl − fkk fl2 ) + fkk f V 00 > 0.
The steady state effects show that an increase in the rate of an investment tax credit will
increase the long-run stock of capital, debt, consumption, and output. The results can be
explained as follows. An increase in the ITC, τ stimulates the formation of capital thereby
leading to a rise in the steady state level of the capital stock. So by reducing the effective
cost of capital, the investment subsidy encourages investment. The rise in the quantity of
investment demanded will cause the representative agent to accumulate more debt. Clearly,
it is possible for the agent to increase his/her stock of debt since he/she faces a lower cost
of borrowing (interest rate). Thus, the expansionary fiscal policy increases (reduces) the
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debt position (current account balance). The higher rate of ITC will lead to a rise in the
permanent wealth of the representative agent. And the wealth effect will increase the level
of consumption of the single traded good. However, the increase in wealth will lower the
marginal utility of wealth. The long run effect of τ on output can be readily derived. From
y = f (k, l),
dȳ
dk̄
d¯l
= fk
+ fl
>0
dτ
dτ
dτ

(1.52)

In the long run, the effect of the ITC on the ratio of the market value to the replacement
cost of capital (Tobin’s q) is negative. This is because τ reduces the effective cost of new
capital, making new capital cheaper than old capital. These results support the conventional
argument that ITCs stimulate investment and GDP growth.
Interestingly, the steady state effect of τ on employment is zero. This is very important,
in light of the fact that the short run effects are positive. It is warranted that we explain
this result further. In the case of perfect capital mobility, at steady state, capital and labor
must grow at the same rate. But in the present model, output and debt must change at
the same rate. Thus, there are two effects on employment. First, due to higher capital, the
marginal productivity of labor is high, which requires more labor. Second, there is a wealth
effect. Positive net wealth in the long run will induce the agent to consume more leisure,
thereby reducing labor supply. These opposite effects are equal in magnitude, hence keeping
the effect on employment unchanged.

A Numerical Evaluation
In this section we perform a detailed numerical evaluation of our model. The numerical evaluation is done, first, because the complex nature of the model with endogenous employment
makes it impossible to show analytically that the model has saddle point stability. With
reasonable functional forms and parameter values, we numerically show that the coefficient
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matrix in (1.41) has two negative and two positive roots. Second, since the models involve fourth order differential systems with two stable roots, we cannot obtain simple phase
diagrams as well as the optimal paths (transitional dynamics) of all the major variables
analytically. The numerical evaluation will help us immensely in this regard. Third, we can
easily perform sensitivity analysis for different parameter values and most importantly, we
can compare the two models numerically to evaluate the effects of investment tax credit.
To begin, we consider the complete model and specify functional forms for the production
function, utility function and the upward sloping supply curve of debt. Following the Real
Business Cycle (RBC) literature, we assume that the instantaneous utility exhibits constant
relative risk aversion, U (c, 1 − l) =

(c1−α (1−l)α )1−σ −1
,
1−σ

and the production function is Cobb

Douglas, y = k θ l1−θ . The functional form of the upward sloping supply curve of debt is
b

specified as r̃ = r∗ + ea f (k,l) − 1 (see Chatterjee and Turnovsky). Following Cooley and
Prescott (1995) and Chatterjee and Turnovsky, we set the share parameter for leisure, α =
0.36, and capital’s share in output, θ = 0.32. In addition, we set the premium on borrowing,
a = 0.25, the world interest rate r∗ = 0.06, the rate of time preference, β = 0.10, and the
initial rate of ITC, τ = 0.10. The relative risk aversion parameter is set to σ = 2.1. To obtain
the initial steady state (benchmark values of the variables), we substitute these parameter
values into the steady state equations (1.45.1) - (1.45.6). Steady state consumption is 0.99,
labor supply is 0.55, capital stock is 3.56, stock of debt is 0.16, marginal utility of wealth
is 0.90, and output is 1.00. Next, we calculate the steady state effects of an increase in the
ITC rate from 10% per annum to 20%. Capital stock increases by 18.9%. There is no steady
state effect on employment. As a result of the increase in the ITC rate, output increases by
5.7%. At the same time we observe the growth rate of the stock of foreign debt to be 5.7%.
This is expected, though. Recall that at the steady state the rate of time preference (which
is fixed by assumption) should be equal to the effective interest rate faced by the economy.
This says that the risk premium in both equilibria must be the same (4% in this example),
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which can only be obtained if both debt and output change proportionately. Our results do
not change significantly when calibrations are run with alternative parameter values.
Now, we do the numerical evaluations in the context of the model with inelastic labor
supply. Here, U (c) =

c1−σ −1
,
1−σ

b

y = k θ and r̃ = r∗ + ea f (k) − 1. We keep the parameter

values and policy variables as used in the previous example. For initial steady state, we
substituted these functional forms into (1.17.1)-(1.17.5) to obtain the level of consumption,
stock of capital, external debt and output to be 1.77, 6.45, 0.47and 1.82 respectively. After
increasing the investment tax credit rate from 10% to 20%, we obtain the new steady state
level of consumption, capital stock and foreign debt to be 1.86, 7.68 and 0.50 respectively.
The growth rate of these variables are very close to those obtained in the complete model.
The output level also increased from 1.82 to 1.92, registering a 5.7% growth rate.

Transitional Dynamics
We now outline the transitional response of the economy to an unanticipated permanent
increase in the ITC. The transitional dynamics following the increase in τ are derived from
the linearized system as given in equations (1.42)-(1.44). In this model, households are
taxed by the government to implement its fiscal policies. Due to a fall in disposable income,
households respond by reducing consumption of goods and leisure. Labor supply in the short
run goes up as a result. Though in the short run capital does not change, output level will
increase due to higher employment. Higher employment increases the marginal productivity
of capital. Moreover, with this new policy, investment appears more attractive due to the
lower cost of capital. As a result the capital stock starts growing. With adjustment costs of
investment, capital adjusts slowly toward its long run level.
The adjustments of all the major variables are non-monotonic in nature. Though we
find no long run effect on employment, the transitional dynamics are very interesting. Our
numerical exercise reveals that after an immediate upward jump, employment keeps growing
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for a while and then gradually declines to reach its original level (see figure B.1). In figure B.4,
capital stock increases throughout the transitional period. However, it must be noted that the
initial growth rate of investment is higher than it is during the later part of the transitional
period. The initial higher growth rate in investment is due to higher productivity of capital
caused by rising employment. The change in the level of output during the transitional
period is captured by the behavior of employment and capital. We observe positive growth
of output during the transitional period. Like investment, the growth rate of output is faster
during the initial adjustment period. After an initial fall, consumption continues to increase
during the early transitional periods before it starts declining again. The detailed adjustment
path of consumption is outlined in Figure B.3.
One of the most important results is the effect on the accumulation of foreign debt.
Higher investment tax credit leads to a higher level of foreign debt in the long run. This
means that during the transitional period the economy accumulates more debt. Moreover,
this accumulation process is non-monotonic. The detailed adjustment path is shown in
figure B.2. Our numerical exercise reveals that the economy accumulates more foreign debt
during the very early phase of the adjustment process. After a short while, the economy
starts saving and as a result it lowers its debt accumulation. The economic intuition is very
clear. We should note that debt and capital are predetermined variables. In the short run,
due to an increase in employment, the output level goes up. As a result, the economy will
improve its creditworthiness. With lower effective cost of borrowing the economy increases
its borrowing. However, the effective interest rate will adjust gradually towards its long run
level and hence the initial growing trend of the foreign debt will be followed by a gradual
decline. Overall, the economy will end up with a higher level of foreign debt.
Focusing our analysis on the current account, it exhibits a non-monotonic adjustment.
During the initial transitional period, the current account position deteriorates, then it
subsequently improves. So during the major part of the transitional period, our model
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explains the positive correlation between savings and investment - the well known FeldsteinHorioka (1980) puzzle. Another important body of literature in international finance is the
literature dealing with adverse terms of trade shocks or a devaluation of domestic currency,
which often claims a J -curve behavior of the current account. Though we do not observe a
pure J -curve type of adjustment, a non-monotonic adjustment with initial decline followed
by a gradual increase certainly warrants attention. Most importantly, our results are due
to optimal behaviors of households and firms in the economy, and not due to institutional
rigidity that the original literature relied upon.
Since our study closely matches that by Sen and Turnovsky (1990), we compare our
results to theirs. First, their steady state results show that employment increases after
an ITC increase. This is in sharp contrast to ours, which finds no steady state effect on
employment. Moreover, we find steady state consumption to be increasing, whereas they
find an ambiguous effect of the ITC increase on consumption. Both studies though find that
an ITC increases the capital stock. Secondly, our short run results indicate that following
an increase in τ. consumption declines while employment increases. Conversely, Sen and
Turnovsky find a positive short run effect on consumption and a negative short run effect
on employment. Finally, the adjustment of all the major variables in our study are nonmonotonic. This is not the case with their study, where the transitional dynamics are
monotonic. The non-monotonicity is an important outcome of the presence of imperfect
capital mobility in our model. In the perfect capital mobility case, at steady state, capital
and labor must grow at the same rate.

1.4

Conclusion

In this paper, we study the dynamic macroeconomic effects of an investment tax credit in a
small open economy with an external debt and sovereign risk - a typical developing economy.
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We use an intertemporal optimizing framework where households have labor/leisure choice
and investment is subject to adjustment costs. We show that investment tax credit, financed
by lump sum taxes, will improve the economy in terms of investment, production and consumption in the long run. The policy has insignificant effect on employment in the long
run though it has significant and interesting transitional dynamics. The economy accumulates higher level of foreign debt, and the debt accumulation exhibits an interesting optimal
path. Our model also explains a positive correlation between savings and investment and a
non-monotonic adjustment of the current account.
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Chapter 2
The Effects of Monetary Policy
2.1

Introduction

Inflation is a major economic issue that takes prominence in policy discussions in many
countries. This is because price instability affects the overall performance of an economy. It
is more pronounced in developing countries, where governments frequently finance deficits
by creating money. As a result, over the past few decades, many central banks have set
inflation targets as a means of keeping the rate of money growth in check.
On top of the monetization, developing economies rely heavily on foreign borrowing.
Although it is argued that inflation normally reduces growth, its effects vary significantly
across developed and developing countries. Most developing countries have low standards
of living and are characterized by high unemployment, low capital accumulation and low
saving rates. As such, to carry out their development programs, many of them rely on
external borrowing1 . This leads to the accumulation of substantial external debts, with its
attendant cost of debt servicing. Oftentimes, these countries default in their debt repayment
commitments2 .
1

They depend on capital inflows from commercial banks and nonbank financial institutions to finance
their development programs.
2
Partly due to the recession of the world economy in the early 1980s, many developing countries were
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The growing external debt stimulates interest in the theoretical analysis of monetary
policy. Moreover, with the majority of the world’s population living in developing countries,
it is important for us to understand the prospects of economic development by examining
the effects of monetary policy in the face of the increasing reliance on external capital. In
this paper we examine the effects of monetary policy in a small open developing economy
with external debt and sovereign risk.
The effects of monetary policy have been a major focus of research. However, the effects
of inflation on economic performance have also been a central source of disagreement. Many
of the theoretical models in the money and growth literature analyze the impact of inflation
on long-run growth. Tobin (1965) studies the ”superneutrality” question by introducing
money into the neoclassical Solow growth model. In this non-optimizing growth model, he
observes that a higher inflation rate in the steady state is associated with higher capital
stock and output per person.
But some researchers do not find any relationship at all. In an explicitly optimizing
framework, Sidrauski (1967) uses the money-in-the utility model to study the superneutarlity of money question. He invalidates Tobin’s result by finding that monetary policy is
superneutral. Moreover, some studies find that an increase in inflation discourages capital
accumulation and economic growth. Stockman (1981) and Abel (1985) employ a cash-inadvance model in which money is complementary to capital to show that inflation has a
negative effect on long-run growth.3 In related work, Mansoorian and Mohsin (2004) show
that a permanent increase in the inflation rate leads to reductions in employment, investment and consumption. Interestingly, Lucas (2000) documents that a decrease in the annual
inflation rate from 10 percent to zero leads to an increase in real income of slightly less than
unable to repay their debts. With the world economy booming again in the 1990s, investors readily advanced
more loans to developing countries, mainly in Asia and Latin America. But lenders suffered debt defaults
again due to the dire consequences of the financial crisis of the 1990s.
3
The cash-in-advance constraint was originally proposed by Clower in 1967. Money does not enter the
utility function directly.
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one percent. The models mentioned above assume perfect flexibility of wages and prices.
However, there is another class of models, which assume wage and price rigidity, known as
new Keynesian models. These models rely on nominal rigidities to create frictions to provide
non-neutral effects of monetary policies.
Most of the existing literature (Sidrauski (1967), Stockman (1981), Abel (1985), Mansoorian and Mohsin (2004), for instance) concentrate on closed economies. In recent years,
though, open economy issues have been dominant in the discussion of monetary policy. The
seminal papers here are by Obstfeld (1981a, 1981b). He uses the money-in-the-utility framework and finds that in the long run higher inflation leads to a higher level of consumption
and a current account surplus. Other related papers which employ CIA constraints in an
open economy setting are Calvo (1987), Calvo and Vegh (1995), and Edwards and Vegh
(1997). Similar to our line of work, Mansoorian and Mohsin (2006) observe that an increase
in the rate of inflation leads to a fall in output and a current account surplus. But a major
drawback of research that focuses on open economies is that with few exceptions they assume
a perfect world capital market with a fixed interest rate.4 This assumption is a strong one
which might not be realistic for small developing economies.5 Incorporating the assumption
of imperfect capital mobility, this paper studies the effects of monetary policy in a developing
economy.
Most developing countries simply default in their repayment commitments. There is also
the risk associated with currency fluctuations and overborrowing. The risk that a borrower
will default on a loan affects the market interest rate. Other problems include moral hazard,
adverse selection, and difficulties in enforcing contracts. These problems have led to the
imposition of credit ceilings, the cutting back entirely on lending and the refusal to advance
further loans when the need arises. However, such measures hurt the recipient countries as it
4

In the infinite horizon, intertemporal optimizing model, it has been commonly assumed that an economy
borrows or lends freely at the existing world interest rate in a perfect capital market.
5
One major problem with international financing agreements is the high risk of default. Risks create
credit frictions in developing countries. The operation of monetary policy is affected by these imperfections.
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stifles growth and development. To continue lending to developing economies, international
capital markets react to the perceived inability of a country to repay by requiring a risk
premium on the rate at which they are willing to lend to such economies (Turnovsky, 1997).
The cost of borrowing is often an increasing function of the stock of debt. The present paper
incorporates this idea by assuming that the small open developing economy faces an upward
sloping supply curve of debt.
With this formulation, a small open developing economy can borrow only at a risk premium (the marginal cost of debt). Thus, a country’s cost of borrowing is modeled to be an
increasing function of its debt to the rest of the world. In the present specification we scale
the level of indebtedness by the ability to service the debt, measured by the level of output.
Thus, it is assumed that the risk premium depends on debt-servicing ability. Bhandari,
Haque, and Turnovsky (1990) note that ”the central point appears to be that creditors are
not as concerned with the absolute amount of debt held by the country as with its ability to
service the debt, which is better represented by debt relative to some measure of servicing
capacity”.
In the small open economy, the rate of time preference must equal the given world real
interest rate in order for a meaningful steady state to exist. This is a disturbing implication
because it means that the marginal utility of wealth is constant at all times and that the
system is continuously in steady state equilibrium. This places limitations on studying
the dynamic effects of monetary policies. Consequently, time separable preferences are not
suitable for studying the effects of monetary policy in this economy. To introduce dynamics
in the model, some form of sluggishness is required. Sluggish behavior is achieved through the
introduction of the upward-sloping supply curve of debt. The presence of the risk premium
substantially changes the equilibrium properties of the economy.
We assume that monetary policy is conducted by targeting inflation (not the rate of
growth of money per se). The strategy involves the announcement of a public commitment
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to a numerical target for inflation. Mishkin (2000) argues that inflation targeting has the
key advantage that it is easily understood by the public and is thus highly transparent.
We assume that at the outset goods must be bought with cash on hand. Thus, money is
introduced into the model in the form of a CIA constraint on consumption alone. The CIA
approach provides an explanation for the role of money - that the holding of money facilitates
the carrying out of transactions. Moreover, the constraint is more appropriate in developing
economies which do not have well-developed credit markets.
The costs of inflation and even hyperinflation continue to be economic problems in most
developing countries, where seigniorage is still a source of government revenue. However, in
the case of debts, inflation can have significant effects. Because debt is usually denominated
in a particular currency, inflation changes the purchasing power of the money to be repaid,
effectively making debt less expensive. We evaluate the effects of changes in inflation on a
number of key macroeconomic variables. We are particularly interested in how debt accumulation, consumption, employment, output, the rate of capital accumulation are affected
by increases in the inflation rate.
We show that a permanent increase in the inflation rate leads to a fall in consumption,
since with a CIA constraint on consumption, the higher inflation rate increases the price of
consumption relative to leisure, inducing the representative household to substitute leisure
for consumption. The resulting fall in labor supply reduces the marginal productivity of
capital, leading to a fall in investment. Higher inflation also leads to a lower level of foreign
debt in the long run. This is due to the decreased level of output in the economy. The
adjustments of all the major variables are non-monotonic in nature. Our calibration exercise
reveals that even though capital decreases throughout the transitional period, the initial rate
of decline of investment is higher than it is during the later part of the adjustment period.
The initial fall in employment actually decreases the marginal productivity of capital. After
the initial jump, employment continues falling for a while before it starts increasing to reach

37

the new steady state. On the other hand, after its initial fall, consumption grows during the
early transitional period before it starts declining again to reach its steady state level.
We observe non-monotonic adjustment of the accumulation of foreign debt; initial decrease followed by gradual increase. Since the negative of foreign debt measures the current
account position of the economy, we can claim that the current account balance of the economy exhibits a non-monotonic adjustment due to a permanent inflationary shock in the
economy. During the initial transitional period the current account position improves, then
deteriorates gradually. Interestingly, during the major part of the transitional period we
observe a positive correlation between savings and investment (the Feldstein-Horioka (1980)
puzzle). The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The model with fixed capital is presented in section 2.2. Section 2.3 outlines the model with capital, and the main conclusions
are given in section 2.4.

2.2

The Model Without Capital

The model is that of a small open economy with CIA constraints that borrows from an
imperfect capital market in a world of ongoing inflation. Following Obstfeld (1981), we
assume that the foreign price level of the single good in the model is fixed at P ∗ . The
domestic price level of the good is P , and it is linked to the foreign price by the relationship

P = EP ∗ ,

(2.1)

where E is the nominal exchange rate (the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency price). The small economy cannot influence the foreign currency price. The
government allows the exchange rate to depreciate according to a pre-announced schedule.
With flexible goods prices the rate of inflation is equal to the rate of depreciation of the
domestic currency Ṗ /P , and it is denoted by π. Also, interest parity, given fixed exchange
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rates, require that the domestic interest rate that prevails within the small open economy
be equal to the rate at which the country can borrow from abroad.
The upward-sloping supply curve of debt facing the economy in its basic form is expressed
as


∗

r̃ = r + Z

b
f (l)


,

(2.2)

where, r̃ is the interest rate charged on foreign debt, b, r∗ is the world interest rate, and Z(b)
is the country-specific risk premium.

2.2.1

The Central Planner

In the present circumstance, the household and production sectors are consolidated, and
consumers and firm owners are assumed to be identical. The representative agent is assumed
to have an infinite planning horizon, faces imperfect capital markets, and has perfect foresight
of the future. His/her decision is to choose consumption, c, labor supply, l, and payment of
debt, b, in order to maximize the present value of lifetime utility, U, as given by:
Z
U=

∞

u(c, l)e−βt dt,

(2.3)

0

where β the rate of time preference is assumed to be strictly positive. The larger β is the
more the agent prefers consumption now relative to consumption in the future.
The utility function is assumed to be additively separable in c and l; i.e. u (c, l) =
U (c) + V (l), with U 0 (c) > 0, U 00 (c) < 0, V 0 (l) < 0 and V 00 (l) < 0. Thus, the representative
agent is assumed to derive positive, but diminishing, marginal utility from consumption.
He/she also derives positive, but diminishing, marginal utility from leisure, meaning that he
obtains positive and increasing marginal disutility from providing labor services. Abstracting
from physical capital, the single traded good is produced by a production function exhibiting
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positive, but diminishing, marginal physical productivity from labor; i.e. y = f (l): f 0 > 0,
f 00 < 0. We also assume that f (l) satisfies the Inada conditions: f (0) = 0, f 0 (0) = ∞, and
f 0 (∞) = 0. Although labor supply is elastic, the population is assumed to be fixed.
The agent also receives monetary transfer with real values τ from the government. Money is
introduced through a cash-in-advance constraint, with the household requiring real money
balances, mt , to finance his/her consumption expenditures:

m ≥ c.

(2.4)

The total real value of assets, a, held by the representative agent is given as follows:

a = m − b.

(2.5)

ȧ = f (l) + τ − r̃b − c − πm,

(2.6)

His/her real flow budget constraint is

where τ is real lump-sum government transfers, and πm is the ”inflation tax” on real money
balances. The agent also has the No Ponzi game condition, which prevents explosive behavior. This condition is a constraint on borrowing that requires that household debt should
not increase asymptotically faster than the interest rate:

limt→∞ at e−

Rt
0

r̃v dv

≥ 0.

(2.7)

The representative agent’s problem therefore is to maximize (2.3), subject to (2.4)-(2.7), and
the initial condition, a (0) = a0 . As long as nominal interest rate is positive, equation (2.4)
will hold with equality. Setting m = c in equation (2.4), the current-value Hamiltonian for
the agent’s problem may be written as:

40

H = U (c) + V (l) + λ [f (l) + τ + r̃a − (1 + r̃ + π) c] .

(2.8)

where λ, the costate variable associated with the state variable a, is the marginal utility of
wealth (or marginal utility of reducing debt for a borrower). In making his/her optimizing
decisions, the representative agent takes r̃, β, and τ as given. This is because he/she assumes
that he/she is unable to influence the interest rate facing the debtor country, which is an
increasing function of the economy’s total debt. Optimizing equation (2.8) leads to the
following first-order optimality conditions with respect to c, l, and a respectively:

0



∗

U (c) = λ 1 + r + Z



b
f (l)




+π ,

(2.9.1)

V 0 (l) = −λf 0 (l) ,

(2.9.2)

λ̇ = λ (β − r̃) ,

(2.9.3)

and the standard transversality condition limt→∞ e−βt λt at = 0, which is imposed to ensure
that the agent’s intertemporal budget constraint is met. The interpretation of the transversality condition is that inasmuch as the agent assigns some positive marginal value to the
asset, the present value of terminal period’s assets is zero; i.e. optimizing agents do not have
any valuable assets left over at the end.
Equation (2.9.1) equates the household’s marginal cost and benefit of postponing one
unit of current consumption. Equation (2.9.2) requires that the marginal disutility of an
additional unit of labor must equal the marginal productivity of labor forgone, priced at the
real wage rate. Rewriting Equation (2.9.3) gives the intertemporal arbitrage relationship,
which asserts that the growth rate of the marginal utility of wealth equals the difference
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between the rate of time preference and the interest rate charged on foreign debt. Now
it should be noted from (2.9.1) and (2.9.2) that the equilibrium levels of c and l can be
represented by the following equations:

c = c(λ, π, b)

(2.10.1)

l = l(λ)

(2.10.2)

The partial derivatives of consumption demand and labor supply implicit in equations
(2.10.1) and (2.10.2) are found by differentiating (2.9.1) and (2.9.2) with respect to λ, π
f 2 [1 + r̃ + π] − λZ 0 bf 0 lλ
λ
λZ 0
and b. This gives: cλ =
<
0,
c
=
<
0,
c
=
< 0,
π
b
f 2 U 00 (c)
U 00 (c)
f U 00 (c)
f0
> 0.
and lλ = − 00
V (l) + λf 00
The four partial derivatives can be explained as follows. The first one implies that, everything else constant, an increase in the marginal utility of wealth, λ, causes a decrease
in consumption. Also, the second one says that, everything else constant, an increase in
inflation, by decreasing the real value of money leads to a decline in consumption. The
third partial derivative means that an increase in the stock of debt, ceteris paribus, causes
a decrease in consumption. Lastly, the fourth says that, when the marginal utility of wealth
increase (wealth decreases), keeping all other variables unchanged, the household is likely to
consume less leisure, and increase his labor supply.

2.2.2

The Government

We simplify the role of the government in this economy for ease of computation. We abstract
completely from government spending on goods and services, and focus solely on monetary
policy. The government (or the monetary authority) chooses the real monetary transfers τ ,
in order to achieve a desired inflation rate π. These decisions are subject to the flow budget
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constraint:

ṁ + πm = τ,

(2.11)

which indicates that total real monetary transfers τ should be equal to total government
revenues from seigniorage (ṁ + πm) . It is assumed that the government is benevolent and
seeks to undertake a policy that maximizes the intertemporal utility of the agent subject
to the equilibrium constraints. As outlined in the introduction, we assume that the central
bank targets the inflation rate by continuously adjusting the transfers τ.

2.2.3

Equilibrium Dynamics

We are now in a position to analyze the dynamics of the economy. By combining equations
(2.5), (2.6), and (2.11), we obtain the debt accumulation equation, which is the negative of
the current account balance.

ḃ = r̃b + c − f (l)

(2.12)

Next, substituting for the optimal solutions of c and l from equations (2.10.1) and (2.10.2)
into Equations. (2.9.3) and (2.12), we get


∗
λ̇ = λ β − r − Z



∗

ḃ = r + Z



b
f (l(λ))

b
f (l(λ))


,

(2.13.1)


b + c (λ, π, b) − f (l(λ)) .

(2.13.2)

Equations (2.13.1) and (2.13.2) jointly determine the dynamics of λ and b. To derive the
saddle path, we linearize equations (2.13.1) and (2.13.2) around the steady state to obtain:
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 λ̇   a11 a12   λ − λ̄ 
 =

,
ḃ
a21 a22
b − b̄
where a11 =
a22 = r̃ +

(2.14)

Z 0 λbf 0 lλ
Z 0 b2 f 0 lλ
Z 0λ
<
0,
a
=
c
−
>
0,
a
=
−
− f 0 lλ ,
21
λ
12
f2
f
f2

bZ 0
+ cb
f

For saddlepoint stability of the system, the determinant of the Jacobian matrix in (2.14)
must be negative. This is, in fact the case; ∆ ≡ a11 a22 − a21 a12 < 0, the system has one
negative eigenvalue and one positive eigenvalue.6 Hence, the equilibrium is saddle point
stable, implying a dynamic adjustment of the stock of debt and of the marginal utility of
wealth. Under saddle point stability, we shall assume that the marginal utility of wealth
responds to shocks instantaneously, while the stock of debt is accumulated gradually. Let us
assume that λ is the negative, stable root. Then the general solution to (2.14) is given by:

λ = λ̄ −

b = b̄ + A1 eµ1 t + A2 eµ2 t ,

(2.15.1)

a21
a21
A1 eµ1 t −
A2 eµ2 t ,
a22 + µ1
a22 + µ2

(2.15.2)

where the coefficients A1 and A2 are determined by appropriate initial and terminal conditions on b and λ. Solutions (2.15.1) and (2.15.2) are substituted into the transversality
condition, and this condition is satisfied if and only if A2 = 0. Starting from the initial stock
of debt b = b0 , the adjustment of b and λ along the optimal path is described by

bt = b̄ + (b0 − b̄)eµ1 t ,
6

The eigenvalues, µ1 and µ2 also satisfy the properties µ2 > |µ1 | , µ2 + µ1 = a11 .
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(2.15.3)


λt = λ̄ −

µ1 − a11
a12




b0 − b̄ eµ1 t .

(2.15.4)

We, thus, conclude the basic description of the model.

2.2.4

Steady State Effects

This section looks at the long-run effects of increases in the inflation rate. We study the
effects of an unanticipated, permanent increase in the inflation rate. Because the equilibrium
is always in steady state, we are able to characterize the optimal rate of monetary growth,
and determine how this affects debt accumulation, marginal utility of wealth, consumption,
and labor supply. The steady state of the system is reached when λ̇ = ḃ = 0.

0





∗

U (c̄) = λ̄ 1 + r + Z

b̄
f (¯l)




+π ,



V 0 ¯l = −λ̄f 0 ¯l ,



∗

β =r +Z

b̄
f (¯l)

(2.16.1)

(2.16.2)


,




b̄
∗
r +Z
b̄ + c̄ = f (¯l).
f (¯l)

(2.16.3)

(2.16.4)

These equations jointly determine the steady state equilibrium values (denoted with an
upper bar) of consumption c̄, labor supply ¯l, debt accumulation b̄, and the marginal utility
of wealth λ̄ implied by a given level of inflation. The steady state effects of an increase in
inflation are obtained by differentiating the steady state system, i.e., equations (2.16.1) to
(2.16.4) with respect to π.
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dλ̄
λf (V 00 + λf 00 )
=−
< 0,
dπ
D

(2.17)

λb(f 0 )2
db̄
=
< 0,
dπ
D

(2.18)

d¯l
λf f 0
=
< 0,
dπ
D

(2.19)

dc̄
(f 0 )2 (f − r̃b)λ
=
<0
dπ
D

(2.20)

where D = (1 + r̃ + π)f {λf 00 + V 00 } + U 00 (f 0 )2 (f − r̃b) < 0.
The steady state effects show that an increase in the inflation rate reduces the longrun marginal utility of wealth, foreign debt, employment, and consumption. The intuition
behind this result is given as follows. This being a CIA economy, the agent needs to hold real
money balance in advance. Thus, depreciation of the domestic currency makes consumption
relatively more expensive (in terms of leisure). As a result, consumption falls. To maximize
his utility, the agent consumes more leisure, leading to a decrease in labor supply. As such
the production level of the economy will fall. With the creditworthiness of the economy
declining, the economy will face higher interest rates due to increasing risk premium. This
will force the economy to reduce borrowing, thereby improving the debt position.

2.3

The Model With Capital

Having set up a simple workable model, we develop a complete model with capital. The
upward-sloping supply curve of debt is now expressed as

∗



r̃ = r + Z
46

bt
f (k, l)


.

(2.21)

For the sake of clarity, we proceed by considering the problem facing each sector in turn. This
way, we will really appreciate the optimization problem of each agent, and clearly calibrate
the transmission mechanism.

2.3.1

The Representative Household

As usual the representative household is assumed to have an infinite planning horizon, faces
imperfect capital markets, and has perfect foresight. He/she chooses his/her private rate of
consumption, c, labor supply, l, and payment of debt, b, in order to maximize the present
value of lifetime utility, U, as given by:
Z
U=

∞

u(c, l)e−βt dt,

(2.22)

0

where β is the rate of time preference, and the utility function is assumed to be additively
separable in c and l; i.e. u (c, l) = U (c) + V (l), with U 0 (c) > 0, U 00 (c) < 0, V 0 (l) < 0 and
V 00 (l) < 0. Thus, the representative agent is assumed to derive positive, but diminishing,
marginal utility from consumption. He/she also derives positive, but diminishing, marginal
utility from leisure, meaning that he obtains positive and increasing marginal disutility from
working.
The representative household also receives monetary transfer with real values τ from
the government. As in the simple model, money is introduced through a cash-in-advance
constraint, with the household requiring real money balances m to finance his consumption
expenditures:

m ≥ c.
The total real value of assets held by the representative household:
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(2.23)

a = m − b.

(2.24)

ȧ = D + wl + τ − r̃b − c − πm,

(2.25)

The flow budget constraint is given by:

where D is the total dividend received by the representative household, w is the wage rate,
τ is real lump-sum government transfers, and πm is the ”inflation tax” on real money
balances. The agent also has the No Ponzi game condition:

limt→∞ at e−

Rt
0

r̃v dv

≥ 0.

(2.26)

The representative household’s problem, therefore, is to maximize (2.22), subject to (2.23)(2.26), and the initial condition, a (0) = a0 . Setting m = c in equation (2.23), the currentvalue Hamiltonian for the agent’s problem may be written as:

H = U (c) + V (l) + λ [D + wl + τ + r̃a − (1 + r̃ + π) c] .

(2.27)

where λ, the co-state variable associated with (2.25) is the marginal utility of wealth (or
marginal utility of reducing debt for a borrower). In making the decisions, the representative
household takes r̃ and τ as given. Optimizing equation (2.27) leads to the following first-order
optimality conditions:


∗
U (c) = λ 1 + r + Z
0

b
f (k, l)

V 0 (l) = −λw,
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+π ,

(2.28.1)

(2.28.2)

λ̇ = λ (β − r̃) ,

(2.28.3)

and the standard transversality condition limt→∞ e−βt λt at = 0. The first-order conditions are
the same as those in equations (2.9.1) - (2.9.3), which have already been explained.

2.3.2

The Representative Firm

Now we discuss the production side of the economy. The representative firm produces
output with a production function exhibiting positive, but diminishing, marginal physical
productivity in capital and labor; i.e. yt = f (kt , lt ): fk > 0, fl > 0, fkk < 0, fll < 0.
The production function is also assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale i.e. fkk fll −
fkl2 = 0, fkl > 0. In this model, we assume that expenditure on any given investment is
an increasing function of the rate of capital accumulation. Since there is cost to installing
capital, investment involves adjustment costs given by the function:

Φ(I) = I + Ψ(I),

(2.29)

where Φ(I) is the total cost associated with the purchase of I units of new capital, and Ψ(I)
are the adjustment costs associated with I. The function Ψ(I) is assumed to be a nonnegative,
convex function, with Φ0 ≥ 0; Φ00 > 0. In addition, we may set Ψ(0) = 0 and Ψ0 (0) = 0,
which means that the cost of zero investment is zero, Φ(0) = 0 and the marginal cost of
initial investment is unity, Φ0 (0) = 1. The dividend payment net of investment expenditure
is

D = f (k, l) − wl − Φ(I),
The firm’s problem is to maximize the present value of its dividend payments:

49

(2.30)

Z

∞

De

−

Rt
0

r̃v dv

0

∞

Z

[f (k, l) − wl − Φ(I)]e−

dt =

Rt
0

r̃v dv

dt,

(2.31)

0

subject to the constraint that the rate of capital accumulation and investment are related
by the constraint:

k̇ = I,

(2.32)

and the initial condition k(0) = k0 , where for simplicity we assume that there is no depreciation. The current value Hamiltonian for the firm’s problem is

H = f (k, l) − wl − Φ(I) + qI,

(2.33)

where qt , the costate variable associated with the state variable k, is the shadow price of
capital (or the Tobin q). The first-order optimality conditions for this problem with respect
to l, I, and k are, respectively:

fl (k, l) = w,

(2.34.1)

Φ0 (I) = q,

(2.34.2)

q̇ = qr̃ − fk (k, l),

(2.34.3)

and the transversality condition limt→∞ e−rt qt kt = 0, which must hold for a global maximum.
Equation (2.34.1) implies that the marginal product of labor must equal the real wage, while
equation (2.34.2) asserts that the marginal cost of investment must equal the shadow price of
capital. Rewriting equation (2.34.3) yields the intertemporal arbitrage relationship, which
implies that the rate of return on domestic capital must equal the rate of return on the
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foreign bond.

2.3.3

The Government

Again, we abstract completely from government spending on goods and services, and focus
solely on monetary policies. The problem of the monetary authority remains the same as
before. The government (or the monetary authority) chooses the real monetary transfers τt ,
in order to achieve a desired inflation rate π, subject to the flow budget constraint:

ṁ + πm = τ,

(2.35)

which indicates that total real monetary transfers τ should be equal to total government
revenues from seigniorage (ṁ + πm) .

2.3.4

Equilibrium Dynamics

We are now in a position to analyze the dynamics of the model.

By combining all the

optimality conditions derived from the household and firms sectors, together with the flow
budget constraints, equilibrium can be described by the following set of equations:


∗
U (c) = λ 1 + r + Z
0

b
f (k, l)




+π ,

(2.36.1)

V 0 (l) = −λfl (k, l),

(2.36.2)

λ̇ = λ (β − r̃) ,

(2.36.3)

Φ0 (I) = q,

(2.36.4)
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q̇ = qr̃ − fk (k, l),

(2.36.5)

k̇ = I,

(2.36.6)

ḃ = r̃b + c + Φ(I) − f (k, l)

(2.36.7)

Now it should be noted from (2.36.1), (2.36.2) and (2.36.4) that the equilibrium levels of c,
l and I can be represented by the following equations:

c = c(λ, k, π, b)

(2.37.1)

l = l(λ, k)

(2.37.2)

I = I(q)

(2.37.3)

The partial derivatives of consumption demand, labor supply and investment implicit in
Equations. (2.37.1), (2.37.2) and (2.37.3) are found by differentiating (2.36.1) and (2.36.2)
with respect to λ, π, b and k and (2.36.4) with respect to q. This gives
cλ =

λ
λZ 0
f 2 [1 + r̃ + π] − λZ 0 bfl lλ
,
c
=
<
0,
c
=
< 0,
π
b
f 2 U 00 (c)
U 00 (c)
f U 00 (c)

λZ 0 bfk
fl
λflk
> 0, lλ = − 00
> 0, lk = − 00
> 0,
00
2
U f
V (l) + λfll
V (l) + λfll
1
and Iq = 00 > 0. The interpretations of the partial derivatives have already been given in
Φ
ck = −

earlier sections.
We are now in a position to analyze the dynamics of the model. The dynamic behavior
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of the economy is determined by the following system of differential equations, (2.38.1) (2.38.4). Noting that c = c(λ, b, k, π), l = l(λ, k), and I = I(q), we obtain



∗
ḃ = r + Z

b
f (k, l(λ, k))


b + c(λ, b, k, π) + Φ(I(q)) − f (k, l(λ, k)),



∗



λ̇ = λ β − r − Z

b
f (k, l(λ, k))


,

(2.38.2)

k̇ = I(q),





∗

q̇ = q r + Z

b
f (k, l(λ, k))

(2.38.1)

(2.38.3)


− fk (k, l(λ, k)).

(2.38.4)

The dynamic structure of the system (2.38) is a fourth order system, which may be expressed
in linearized form about the steady-state equilibrium as






 ḃ   a11 a12 a13 a14
  
 λ̇   a21 a22 a23 0
  
 =
 k̇   0
0
0 a34
  
  
q̇
a41 a42 a43 a44

where a11

a13

a23





  b − b̄ 


 λ − λ 



,
  k − k̄ 




q − q̄







bZ 0
b2 Z 0
= cb + r̃ +
, a12 = cλ − 1 + 2 fl lλ ,
f
f





b2 Z 0
λZ 0
λZ 0 bfl lλ
= ck − 1 + 2 (fk + fl lk ) , a14 = Iq , a21 = −
, a22 =
,
f
f
f2
 0

λZ 0 b
qZ 0
qZ bfl lλ
= 2 (fk + fl lk ), a34 = Iq , a41 =
, a42 = −
+ fkl lλ ,
f
f
f2
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(2.39)


qZ 0 b
=−
(fk + fl lk ) + (fkk + fkl lk) , and a44 = β.
f2


a43

All elements of the coefficient matrix in (2.39) are evaluated at their steady state values.
The system has two predetermined variables (b and k) and two jump variables (λ and q).
For saddle point stability the coefficient matrix must have two negative and two positive
eigenvalues. Because of the complexity of the model, it is not possible to show saddlepoint
stability analytically. Our numerical exercise, however, shows that the conditions for saddlepoint stability will be satisfied with reasonable functional forms and parameter values. The
mathematical derivatives of the optimal path are given below:
Let the eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix in (2.39) be denoted by λ1 , λ2 , λ3 , and λ4 .
Suppose λ1 and λ2 are negative, while λ3 and λ4 are positive. Also, suppose (νi1 , νi2 , ν13 , ν14 )
is the eigenvector associated with λi , ∀ i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Then we can write






 bt − b̄  

 
 µt − µ̄  

 

=
 k − k̄  
 t
 

 
qt − q̄



ν11 ν21 ν31 ν41  


ν12 ν22 ν32 ν42 



ν13 ν23 ν33 ν43 


ν14 ν24 ν34 ν44

B1 e

λ1 t

B2 e

λ2 t

B3 eλ3 t
B4 eλ4 t











(2.40)

where B1 , B2 , B3 and B4 are the coefficients yet to be determined. It should be noted that
b and k are predetermined variables. For the solution to be bounded we set B3 = B4 = 0.
Hence, we can write the following:

bt − b̄ = ν11 B1 eλ1 t + ν21 B2 eλ2 t

(2.41.1)

kt − k̄ = ν13 B1 eλ1 t + ν23 B2 eλ2 t

(2.41.2)

Assuming that at time t = 0 we have b = b0 and k = k0 , we can solve (2.41.1) and
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(2.41.2) for B1 and B2 to obtain equations for the saddle path as follows:

bt − b̄ = (b0 − b̄)(C1 eλ1 t + C2 eλ2 t ) + (k0 − k̄)(C3 eλ1 t + C4 eλ2 t ),

(2.42.1)

kt − k̄ = (b0 − b̄)(C5 eλ1 t + C6 eλ2 t ) + (k0 − k̄)(C7 eλ1 t + C8 eλ2 t ),

(2.42.2)

µt − µ̄ = (b0 − b̄)(C9 eλ1 t + C10 eλ2 t ) + (k0 − k̄)(C11 eλ1 t + C12 eλ2 t ),

(2.42.3)

qt − q̄ = (b0 − b̄)(C13 eλ1 t + C14 eλ2 t ) + (k0 − k̄)(C15 eλ1 t + C16 eλ2 t ),

(2.42.4)

where Ci is given as
C1 =

−ν21 ν13
−ν11 ν21
ν21 ν11
ν11 ν23
, C2 =
, C3 =
, C4 =
,
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21

C5 =

ν23 ν13
−ν23 ν13
−ν21 ν13
ν23 ν11
, C6 =
, C7 =
, C8 =
,
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21

C9 =

−ν22 ν13
−ν11 ν21
ν21 ν11
ν12 ν23
, C10 =
, C11 =
, C12 =
,
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21

C13 =

−ν24 ν13
−ν21 ν14
ν24 ν11
ν14 ν23
, C14 =
, C15 =
, C16 =
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21
ν11 ν23 − ν13 ν21

This concludes the basic description of the model.

2.3.5

The Effects of Inflation

In this section we analyze the long run effects of an unanticipated, permanent increase
in inflation. We also conduct a numerical exercise and discuss the transitional adjustments
of the important variables.
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Long-run Effects
Now we look at the steady state effects of an unanticipated and permanent increase in the
inflation rate. At the steady state we must have λ̇ = q̇ = k̇ = ḃ = 0. Thus, the steady state
is captured by the following equations:

0





∗

U (c̄) = λ̄ 1 + r + Z

b̄
f (k̄, ¯l)




+π ,


V 0 ¯l = −λ̄fl (k̄, ¯l),



∗

β =r +Z

b̄
f (k̄, ¯l)

(2.43.2)


,

(2.43.3)

q̄ = 1,

fk (k̄, ¯l) = r∗ + Z



f (k̄, ¯l) = r + Z
∗





(2.43.1)

(2.43.4)

b̄
f (k̄, ¯l)

b̄
f (k̄, ¯l)


,

(2.43.5)


b̄ + c̄.

(2.43.6)

These equations jointly determine the steady state equilibrium values of consumption c̄,
labor supply ¯l, capital stock k̄, debt accumulation b̄, marginal utility of wealth λ̄, and the
shadow price of capital q̄.
Equations (2.43.3) - (2.43.5) deserve special mention here. For instance, in equation
(2.43.4), in the steady state, the shadow price of capital is equal to one. This is very much
consistent with the Tobin q theory of investment. Looking at equations (2.43.3) and (2.43.5),
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in the long run, the marginal productivity of capital is fixed at β. This implies that capital
and labor will change proportionately. Moreover, from equations (2.43.3), it is clear that
in equilibrium, Z(.) remains unchanged (unless we have some foreign interest rate shocks).
This means that foreign debt and output will also change proportionately.
The steady state effects of an increase in inflation, obtained by differentiating the long-run
equilibrium, i.e., equations (2.43.1) - (2.43.6) with respect to π are as follows:
dq̄
= 0,
dπ

(2.44)

dk̄
λfkl fl f
=
< 0,
dπ
∆

(2.45)

d¯l
λfkk fl f
=−
< 0,
dπ
∆

(2.46)

bλ(−flk fk fl + fl2 fkk )
db̄
=−
< 0,
dπ
∆

(2.47)

dλ̄
λfkk f V 00
=
< 0,
dπ
∆

(2.48)

dc̄
λfl {(fk fkl − fl fkk )(f − r̃b)}
=
< 0,
dπ
∆

(2.49)

where ∆ = U 00 (f − r̃b)(flk fk fl − fkk fl2 ) − (1 + r̃ + π)fkk f V 00 < 0.
Money is not superneutral here as the steady state effects show that an increase in the
inflation rate has negative effects on the long-run marginal utility of wealth, debt, labor
supply, and consumption. The intuition behind these results are given as follows. In a CIA
economy, the agent needs to hold real money balance in advance to finance consumption
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expenditures. Thus, an increase in inflation makes consumption relatively more expensive
(in terms of leisure). As a result, consumption and work effort fall. To maximize his/her
utility, the agent substitutes away from consumption goods and toward leisure. With labor
supply decreasing, the marginal productivity of capital will decline. This will lead to a
decline in investment. From y = f (k, l), we can easily verify (using (2.45) and (2.46))
dk̄
d¯l
dȳ
= fk
+ fl
< 0. As such the production level of the economy will fall. Also,
that
dπ
dπ
dπ
in equilibrium, the real interest rate is still independent of inflation, leaving the marginal
productivity of capital fixed. Hence, both capital and labor will decline proportionately. It
should also be noted that in the steady state the effective real interest rate in the small
developing economy is fixed and equal to the rate of time preference. This implies that the
risk premium paid by the economy in the new equilibrium is the same as it was initially.
This is only possible if the debt position and the output level also change proportionately.
This explains why the net foreign debt declines in the steady state. It must be noted that
our results on the effects of inflation on consumption, investment and employment are in
agreement with Mansoorian and Mohsin (2006). In their paper the small open economy runs
a current account surplus, which is equivalent to the decline in external debt in our case.
However, they impose an intertemporal solvency condition in order to study the dynamics
of their model. Thus, they are able to study the temporary effects of inflation too. That is
not the case here.

A Numerical Evaluation
In this section we perform a detailed numerical evaluation of our model. As outlined earlier,
this is important for many reasons. First, because of the complex nature of the model, we
are unable to show analytically that the model has saddle point stability. With reasonable
functional forms and parameter values, we can numerically show that the coefficient matrix
in (2.39) has two negative and two positive roots. Second, since the models involve fourth
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order differential equation systems with two stable roots, we cannot obtain simple phase
diagrams as well as the optimal paths (transitional dynamics) of all the major variables
easily. A numerical evaluation will help us immensely in this regard. Third, we can easily
perform sensitivity analysis for different parameter values to evaluate the effectiveness of
monetary policy.
To begin, we specify functional forms for the production function, utility function and
the upward sloping supply curve of debt. Following the Real Business Cycle (RBC) literature, we assume that the instantaneous utility exhibits constant relative risk aversion,
U (c, 1 − l) =

(c1−α (1−l)α )1−σ −1
,
1−σ

and the production function is Cobb Douglas, y = k θ l1−θ . The
b

functional form of the upward sloping supply curve of debt is specified as r̃ = r∗ + ea f (k,l) − 1
(see Chatterjee and Turnovsky). Following Cooley and Prescott (1995); Chatterjee and
Turnovsky (2007); and Mohsin and Mansoorian (2006), we set the share parameter for
leisure, α = 0.36, and capital’s share in output, θ = 0.32. In addition, we set the premium
on borrowing, a = 0.25, the world interest rate r∗ = 0.06, the rate of time preference,
β = 0.10, and the initial inflation rate, π = 0.10. The relative risk aversion parameter is set
to σ = 2.1. To obtain the initial steady state, we substitute these parameter values into the
steady state equations (2.43). The steady state level of consumption is 0.86, labor supply
is 0.51, capital stock is 2.80, stock of debt is 0.14 and output is 0.87. Now we calculate the
steady state effects of an increase in the inflation rate from 10% to 15%. Capital stock and
employment both decrease by 2.02 percent. As a result of this inflationary shock, output also
decreases by 2.02 percent. At the same time we observe a 2.02 percent decline in the stock
of foreign debt. It should be recalled that at the steady state the rate of time preference
(which is fixed by assumption) should be equal to the effective interest rate faced by the
economy. This means that the risk premium in both equilibria must be the same (4% in this
example), which can only be obtained if both debt and output change proportionately.
As part of our numerical exercise, we calculate the short run effects too. At t = 0 when
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the inflationary shock is implemented, there are no short run effects on the stock of debt
and the level of capital as both of them are predetermined variables. Consumption initially
declines from 0.86 to 0.85, a 1.10 percent decrease. On the other hand, employment decreases
from 0.51 to 0.49, a 2.57 percent decrease. Thus, both consumption and employment decline
in the short run. Output also decreases in the short run. These results are consistent with
a traditional IS-LM analysis, where a higher rate of inflation decreases real money balances.
The detailed adjustments of the level of employment, the stock of debt, consumption, and
the capital stock are given in figures B.5, B.6, B.7, and B.8 respectively.
The transitional dynamics following the increase in π are derived from the linearized
system. With a CIA constraint on consumption, an increase in the inflation rate makes
consumption more expensive (in terms of leisure). Households respond by reducing consumption of goods and increasing the consumption of leisure. Labor supply in the short run
goes down as a result. Though in the short run capital does not change, output level will
decrease due to the fall in employment. The lower level of employment in the production
process decreases the marginal productivity of capital and hence investment starts declining.
As a result the capital stock starts falling. After the initial fall, consumption continues to
increase during the early transitional periods before it starts declining again. The detailed
adjustment path of consumption is outlined in Figure B.7.
The adjustments of other major variables are non-monotonic as well. Our numerical
exercise reveals that after an immediate downward jump, employment keeps dropping for
a while and then gradually increases to reach its new steady state level (see Figure B.5).
On the other hand, capital stock decreases throughout the transitional period. However,
the initial rate of disinvestment is higher than it is during the later part of the transitional
period. Figure B.8 outlines the adjustment path of capital stock.
One of the important results is the effect on the accumulation of foreign debt. Higher
inflation in the economy leads to a lower level of foreign debt in the long run. This means
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that during the transitional period the economy repays some of its outstanding foreign debt.
Moreover, this process is non-monotonic. Its detailed adjustment path is given in Figure B.6.
Our numerical exercise reveals that the economy deccumulates foreign debt during the very
early phase of the adjustment process. After a short while, the economy starts accumulating
debt again. The economic intuition is very clear. It should be noted that debt and capital
are predetermined variables. In the short run, due to an decrease in employment, the output
level goes down. As a result, the economy worsens its creditworthiness instantly. With a
higher effective cost of borrowing, it is not surprising that the economy starts to borrow less.
However, the effective interest rate will adjust gradually towards its long run level and hence
the initial falling trend of the foreign debt will be followed by a gradual increase. Overall,
the economy will end up with a lower level of foreign debt. Since the negative of foreign debt
measures the current account balance of the economy, we can claim that the current account
also exhibits a non-monotonic adjustment. During the initial transitional period, the current
account position improves, then it subsequently decreases. Also, another significant result
is that during the major part of the transitional period we observe a positive correlation
between savings and investment.

2.4

Conclusion

In this paper, we study the dynamic macroeconomic effects of monetary policy aimed at
targeting inflation rate. We consider a small open economy with an external debt and
sovereign risk - a typical developing economy. Our economy faces an upward sloping supply
curve of debt as well. Households hold money for consumption expenditure and can make
labor/leisure choice to maximize welfare. Firms maximize profits and investment is subject
to adjustment costs. We show that increase in inflation rate lowers the level of investment,
employment, external debt, production and consumption in the long run. Thus, we observe
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a reverse Tobin effect. All the major variables exhibit non-monotonic transitional dynamics.
Furthermore, our model is capable of explaining the positive correlation between savings
and investment - the well known Feldstein-Horioka (1980) puzzle. This observed savinginvestment correlation can be helpful in measuring capital mobility.
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Chapter 3
The Real Effects of Inflation:
Empirical Evidence
3.1

Introduction

In the postwar era, high and persistent inflation has been a trademark of many developing countries. Indeed, a primary goal of stabilization plans in developing economies is the
achievement of low inflation. As a result, inflation targeting has been adopted by a number of
emerging economies. As monetary policy has become an important policymaking tool, many
researchers have attempted to measure the real effects of inflation on macroeconomic variables. However, the effects of inflation on economic performance have been a major source
of disagreement among economists. Whereas households and firms are generally thought to
perform poorly when inflation is high, real interest rates also fall in response to a rise in
inflation. In this chapter we focus on the relationships between the macroeconomic variables in a dynamic monetary equilibrium model. Specifically, we examine the response of
a small open economy to inflationary shocks. An optimizing model with a cash-in-advance
(CIA) constraint is the theoretical underpinning of this empirical exercise. As outlined in the
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theoretical model, we assume that monetary policy is conducted by targeting the inflation
rate.
Many of the empirical models in the money and growth literature analyze the impact
of inflation on the long-run growth of macroeconomic variables. The bulk of these studies,
though, are conducted in the context of highly developed economies. But inflation affects
developing economies in ways that are not seen in the developed world. Since our aim is to
evaluate the effects of inflation in a small open developing economy, we will focus exclusively
on past studies that did same. Past empirical studies have found different results. Some
researchers find positive effects of inflation on economic performance. Grier and Grier (2006)
investigate the effects of both inflation and inflation uncertainty on output growth in Mexico
at business cycle frequencies. They estimate an augmented multivariate GARCH-M model
for inflation and output growth using monthly data from 1972 to 2001. They find that
inflation uncertainty lowers output growth, while the direct effect of average inflation on
output is actually positive and significant. This result is consistent with the Tobin effect.
A few other empirical studies find no long run effects of inflation. Using data from
high inflation countries, Israel and Turkey, Mallick and Mohsin (2007a) use the recursive
identification strategy to show that inflation has no long-run real effects on consumption,
investment, and the current account. Their results are robust even after allowing for inflation
volatility. In a related study, Carneiro and Faria (2001) investigate the relationship between
inflation and output for another high inflation country – Brazil. Employing a bivariate vector
autoregressive (VAR) model for the period 1980:1-1995:7, they use a Blanchard and Quah
decomposition to assess the effects of temporary and permanent shocks. They find that
inflation does not impact real output in the long run, but that in the short run there exists
a negative effect from inflation on output.
Furthermore, some studies find that inflation has negative effects. Singh and Kalirajan
(2003) empirically examine the inflation-growth nexus in India for the period 1971-1988.
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Specifically, they find out whether there is a threshold level of inflation for India. They
conclude that there is no need to be concerned about the threshold level since any increase
in inflation from the previous period negatively affects growth. Barro (1996) also carries
out an empirical research on the relation between inflation and economic performance using
cross-sectional data from over one hundred countries. He finds that a 10% increase in the
annual inflation rate leads to a 0.24% decrease in the annual growth rate of real gross domestic
product.
The empirical studies mostly employ vector autoregressive (VAR) models. A very important step in the use of VAR methodology is the identification of shocks. The conventional
identification strategy has been criticized severally. Unlike the recursive Choleski decomposition used in previous studies, this study examines the effects of inflation shocks in a small
open developing economy with external debt using Uhlig’s (2005) identification procedure.
There are many compelling reasons that justify the need for this study. First, the empirical
evidence on the effects of monetary policy is inconclusive. Second, most studies rely on the
ad hoc Choleski decomposition to identify the effects of inflation shocks. Third, though a
few studies develop open economy models to examine the effects of inflation, the theoretical
motivations are not completely satisfactory. Finally, there is the need to understand the
long-run effects of changes in inflation in developing economies that borrow extensively. To
the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical study that examines the real effects of inflation in a small open developing economy with external debt. The present study attempts
to fill this gap.
The objective is therefore to further examine the effect of an inflation shock on economic
activity using most recent data and improved time series techniques. Specifically, we estimate
a four-variable VAR for the period 1970-2004. The variables are inflation, external debt,
consumption, and investment. We address a few pertinent questions about the business
cycle behavior of the system. Does foreign debt respond dynamically to exogenous changes

65

in inflation? What about the other variables? The set of questions will be answered by the
moving average representation of the VAR and its corresponding impulse response functions.
Specifically, in this paper, the answer is uncovered by using the pure sign restrictions
approach, an improved time series econometric technique. The main findings are that an
inflation shock leads to declines in real consumption, real investment and real external debt.
The evidence supplied does not conclusively rule out the possibility of some other factors
driving the results. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence is consistent with our theoretical
model and calibrations. Furthermore, the results tend to be robust when we compare our
structural VAR estimates with those of a standard VAR model.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 3.2 discusses the theoretical
motivation of the study, section 3.3 outlines the empirical methods used, section 3.4 details
the data and results, while brief concluding remarks are given in section 3.5.

3.2

Theoretical Motivation

The theoretical model has been fully developed in chapter 2 of the dissertation. For the
sake of continuity the main features are briefly outlined here. The model is that of a small
open economy with cash-in-advance constraints on consumption expenditure. The economy
borrows from an imperfect capital market in a world of ongoing inflation. The real interest
rate charged by creditors is assumed to be an increasing function of the debt-income ratio.
The representative household chooses his private rate of consumption, c, labor supply, l,
and payment of real foreign debt, b, in order to maximize the present value of lifetime utility,
U, as given by:
Z
U=

∞

u(c, l)e−βt dt,

(3.1)

0

where β is the rate of time preference, and the utility function is assumed to be additively
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separable in c and l; i.e. u (c, l) = U (c) + V (l), with U 0 (c) > 0, U 00 (c) < 0, V 0 (l) < 0 and
V 00 (l) < 0. Money is introduced through a cash-in-advance constraint, with the household
requiring real money balances m to finance his consumption expenditures:

m ≥ c.

(3.2)

The total real value of assets held by the representative household:

a = m − b.

(3.3)

ȧ = D + wl + τ − r̃b − c − πm,

(3.4)

The flow budget constraint is given by:

where D is the total dividend received by the representative household, w is the wage rate,
τ is real lump-sum government transfers, and πm is the ”inflation tax” on real money
balances. The representative household’s problem, therefore, is to maximize (3.1), subject
to (3.2)-(3.4), and the initial condition, a (0) = a0 . The first-order optimality conditions are
as follows:

0





∗

U (c) = λ 1 + r + Z

b
f (k, l)




+π ,

(3.5.1)

V 0 (l) = −λw,

(3.5.2)

λ̇ = λ (β − r̃) ,

(3.5.3)

All variables are as previously defined.
The representative firm produces output with a production function exhibiting positive,
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but diminishing, marginal physical productivity in capital and labor. The production function is also assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale. In this model investment involves
adjustment costs given by the function:

Φ(I) = I + Ψ(I),

(3.6)

where Φ(I) is the total cost associated with the purchase of I units of new capital, and
Ψ(I) are the adjustment costs associated with I. The dividend payment net of investment
expenditure is

D = f (k, l) − wl − Φ(I),

(3.7)

The firm’s problem is to maximize the present value of its dividend payments:
Z

∞

De
0

−

Rt
0

r̃v dv

∞

Z

[f (k, l) − wl − Φ(I)]e−

dt =

Rt
0

r̃v dv

dt,

(3.8)

0

subject to the constraint that the rate of capital accumulation and investment are related
by the constraint:

k̇ = I,

(3.9)

and the initial condition k(0) = k0 . The first-order optimality conditions for this problem
with respect to l, I, and k are, respectively:

fl (k, l) = w,

(3.10.1)

Φ0 (I) = q,

(3.10.2)
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q̇ = qr̃ − fk (k, l),

(3.10.3)

Looking at the problem of the government, we focus solely on monetary policies. The
government (or the monetary authority) chooses the real monetary transfers τt , in order to
achieve a desired inflation rate π, subject to the flow budget constraint:

ṁ + πm = τ,

(3.11)

which indicates that total real monetary transfers τ should be equal to total government
revenues from seigniorage (ṁ + πm).
Combining all the optimality conditions and the budget constraint of the government, we
obtain the following equations that describe equilibrium in the economy for a given inflation
rate:


∗
U (c̄) = λ̄ 1 + r + Z
0

b̄
f (k̄, ¯l)




+π ,


V 0 ¯l = −λ̄fl (k̄, ¯l),

∗



β =r +Z

b̄
f (k̄, ¯l)

(3.12.2)


,

(3.12.3)

q̄ = 1,

fk (k̄, ¯l) = r∗ + Z
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(3.12.1)

(3.12.4)

b̄
f (k̄, ¯l)


,

(3.12.5)

f (k̄, ¯l) = r + Z
∗



b̄
f (k̄, ¯l)


b̄ + c̄.

(3.12.6)

We showed previously that the long run effects of inflation on the major macroeconomic
variables are as follows:
λfkl fl f
dk̄
=
< 0,
dπ
∆

(3.13)

d¯l
λfkk fl f
=−
< 0,
dπ
∆

(3.14)

db̄
bλ(−flk fk fl + fl2 fkk )
=−
< 0,
dπ
∆

(3.15)

dc̄
λfl {(fk fkl − fl fkk )(f − r̃b)}
=
< 0,
dπ
∆

(3.16)

where ∆ = U 00 (f − r̃b)(flk fk fl − fkk fl2 ) − (1 + r̃ + π)fkk f V 00 < 0.
Clearly, the steady state effects show that an increase in the inflation rate reduces the longrun debt, investment, and consumption. The detailed theoretical inferences are found in the
previous chapter. Moreover, through our calibration exercise of the theoretical model we
found short-run declines of these variables.

3.3

Empirical Methodology

In this section we evaluate the proposed model empirically by utilizing vector autoregressive
methods. First, we define precisely what a vector autoregressive model is. Second, we
discuss structural VARs and the sign restrictions approach. VAR models are multivariate

70

time series models that are used as an alternative to structural econometric models. They are
convenient for summarizing the first and second moment properties of data. VARs assume
that all variables are interdependent and thus should be treated as endogenous. Thus, in
contrast to the traditional econometric approach, shocks in the VAR methodology ought to
be uncorrelated with one another. They have been used extensively for forecasting and policy
analysis ever since they were introduced to macroeconomics by Sims (1980). These models
use only the observed time series properties of the data to forecast economic variables. So
the forecast at time t of a variable Y is a function of past values of itself and current and
past values of all other variables in the system.
A VAR is given by:

Yt = a0 + a1 Yt−1 + a2 Yt−2 + ... + al Yt−l + ut , t = 1, ..., T,

(3.17)

where Yt is an m × 1 vector of variables at date t = 1 − m, ..., T, a(i) are coefficient matrices
of size m × m and ut is the one-step ahead prediction error (or innovation) with variancecovariance matrix Σ. A time trend may be added to (3.17) if needed. Using the Choleski
decomposition of Σ, the covariance matrix may be written as Σ = H −1 H

0 −1

, where H −1 is

lower triangular (see Sims (1980) for details).
Dynamic responses to a particular shock, referred to as impulse responses are mainly used
in interpreting VAR models. Assume that we know the ai ’s, the ut ’s and Σ. It would still
be impossible to compute the dynamic response function of Yt to the fundamental shocks in
the economy. This is because ut is the one step ahead forecast error in Yt . It is not proper
to assume that any element of ut corresponds to a particular shock, say, monetary policy
shock, since each element of ut reflects the effects of all the fundamental economic shocks.
To analyze the response of the system to a monetary policy shock, the VAR is transformed
into its moving average system:
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Yt = µ +

∞
X

ai ut−i ,

(3.18)

i=0

where µ is the mean of the process, and the coefficient matrix ai represents the response
of the system to a one standard error innovation in ut . The moving average representation
allows us to trace out the time path of the various shocks contained in the VAR system.

3.3.1

Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) Models

The standard VAR is a reduced form model and meaningful economic interpretation of the
results is often impossible unless the reduced form VAR is linked to an economic model. For
economically meaningful impulse responses, Sims (1980) suggests that the contemporaneous
coefficient matrix be made triangular for identification. The use of a triangular matrix
obtained from a Choleski decomposition of Σ amounts to recursive identification with a socalled Wold causal ordering of the variables. It assumes that some shocks may influence only
a subset of variables within the current period. For instance, an impulse in the first variable
can have a contemporaneous effect on all other variables, whereas an impulse in the second
variable can also have a contemporaneous impact on the rest of the variables but not on the
first one, and so on.
The only role for economic theory is to specify which variables to include in the system. So
the identification scheme is considered ad hoc or atheoretic. Moreover, the zero restrictions
on the contemporaneous impact of shocks might not be consistent with economic theory. If
economic theory is used to provide the link between forecast errors and fundamental shocks,
we call the resulting model an SVAR. As such, an SVAR is a standard VAR where the
restrictions needed for identification are provided by economic theory. Because the causal
ordering do not have structural interpretation, other restrictions have been proposed. These
include:
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• The ruling out of instantaneous effects of some shocks on certain variables. In this case
zero restrictions are imposed just as in the Choleski decomposition approach, except
that the zero restrictions do not have to result in a triangular matrix, Sims (1986).
• Variance restriction.
• Usage of the method suggested by Blanchard and Quah (1989) that provides a unique
decomposition of a series into its temporary and permanent components.
• The imposition of sign restrictions on impulse response functions (for example, Faust,
1998, Canova and De Nicolo, 2002, and Uhlig, 2005). Here, certain shocks are required
to have positive or negative effects on some variables for a certain period.

3.3.2

The Pure-sign-restriction Approach

The approach has been used variously to study the effects of monetary policy. Faust (1998),
using sign restrictions, imposes identifying restrictions on impulse response functions only
on impact. The approach searches through all possible identifications of the VAR for one
that produces the largest responses of real variables to monetary policy shocks, whilst being
subjected to the condition that the implied structural model must produce impulse responses
that are conformable to the sign restrictions. Canova and De Nicolo (2002) also impose sign
restrictions explicitly on pairwise cross-correlation functions, adding restrictions until the
maximum number of shocks is uniquely identified.
Furthermore, Uhlig (2005) uses impulse responses rather than pairwise cross-correlations.
His identification procedure uses other criteria to select among orthogonal decompositions
satisfying the restrictions and not imposing increasingly stringent restrictions to eliminate
candidate orthogonalizations. This approach is also different in the sense that restrictions
on the signs are imposed only for a few periods following the shock. The sign restriction
approach has also been used to study the effects of fiscal policy shocks (Mountford and
73

Uhlig, 2002) and exchange rate puzzles (Scholl and Uhlig, 2007). Indeed, the methodology
is gaining huge popularity. Some recent studies that have employed the methodology are
Vargas-Silva (2007), and Rafiq and Mallick (2008).
The sign restriction approach has several advantages over other methods of identification.
First, the approach makes explicit use of restrictions that researchers often use implicitly,
thus allowing for a systematic analysis of robustness. Second, it avoids the imposition of zero
constraints on the contemporaneous impact matrix or the long-run effects of the shocks that
may not be consistent with economic theory or may be misleading. Third, the sign restriction
approach accounts for both data and identification uncertainty by using a thorough Bayesian
procedure that draws from the posterior distribution of the reduced form VAR covariance
matrix and coefficients. The Bayesian approach is computationally simple and permits a
nice way of drawing error bands for statistics of interest. Fourth, sign restrictions are weak;
they do not lead to exact identification of the reduced form VAR. For example, restrictions
are imposed for only one or two periods ahead in our study.
The key steps involved in the identification procedure starting with a VAR are as follows.
After estimating the reduced form VAR model, in the first step, we randomly draw from
the posterior distributions of the matrix of reduced form VAR coefficients, the variance
covariance matrix of the error term, Σ. The usual structural VAR approach assumes that
the error terms, ut , are related to structural macroeconomic shocks, εt , via a matrix A, hence
ut = Aεt . The identification approach here is to represent the one-step ahead prediction errors
into economically meaningful or fundamental shocks so that there are n fundamental shocks
which are mutually orthogonal and normalized to be of variance one. Hence, Σ = E[ut u0t ] =
Ae[εt ε0t ]A0 = AA0 , where this equation can be described as the Choleski decomposition of Σ.
Given this restriction, Uhlig’s (2005) identification method searches over the space of
possible impulse vectors, Ai εi to find those impulse responses that agree with standard
theory. The aim is to find an impulse vector, a, where a ∈ <n , iff there is some matrix A,
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such that AA0 = Σ, where A = [a1, ..., an ], so that a is a column vector of A. As a result, a,
is an impulse vector if and only if there is an n−dimensional vector α of unit length so that
n
P
a = A0 α and hence Σ = AA0 =
ai a0i . Once the impulse vector a has been appropriated,
i=1

the impulse is calculated as εa (k) =

n
P

αi εi (k), where εi (k) ∈ <n is the vector response at

i=1

horizon k to the ith shock in a Choleski decomposition of Σ (Uhlig, 2005). This way, we
obtain a range of impulse responses that are compatible with the sign restrictions. We argue
that our identifying sign restrictions are plausible as they produce inflation shocks that, first,
match our theoretical model and, secondly, are in broad consistency with the conventional
view of what economists perceive when they think about inflation shocks.
The results can be quite sensitive to the choice of prior. Nonetheless, we follow Uhlig
by using the Normal-Wishart prior, which is algebraically convenient. The prior is a way to
express the context of the Bayesian estimation in which initial data are updated as new data
becomes available. Furthermore, the Bayesian prior eliminates the problem of over-fitting
without reducing the dimension of the model. Assumption A.2 on page 390 in Uhlig (2005)
states that if the parameters (B, Σ, α) are drawn jointly from a prior on Rl×m×m × ℘m × ϑm ,
the prior is proportional to a Normal-Wishart density multiplied with an indicator variable
on Ã(Σ)α ∈ U(B, Σ, K). To draw from this posterior, we take a joint draw from both the
posterior for the unrestricted Normal-Wishart posterior for the VAR parameters (B, Σ) as
well as a uniform distribution over the unit sphere αin ϑm . Then we construct the impulse
vector a, and calculate the impulse response rk,j at horizon k = 0, ..., K for the variables j,
representing the variables of interest. If all these impulse response functions satisfy the sign
restrictions, we keep the draw. Otherwise, we discard it. The process is repeated sufficiently,
and statistics calculated based on the draws kept. The Bayesian Monte Carlo procedure is
summarized as follows:
1. Take n1 draws from the posterior of the reduced form VAR
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2. Take n2 draws from an independent uniform prior
3. Construct the impulse vector
4. Calculate the impulse responses at chosen horizon
5. Check if the impulses satisfy the restriction
6. If they do keep the draw; otherwise discard it
7. Calculate median response and probability bands using kept draws
In the estimation we use n1 = n2 = 100 and K = 1, 2.

3.4

Data and Empirical Results

In this section we provide information on the data used for this study and detail our results. We estimate a VAR with four endogenous variables for six countries. The variables
are inflation (INF ), real consumption (CONS ), real investment (INV ), and real external
debt (DEBT ). Inflation is measured by the consumer price index. Household final consumption expenditure (CONS) is the market value of all goods and services, including durables
purchased by households. Gross capital formation is used as proxy for investment and it
is the sum of fixed gross capital formation, changes in inventories and acquisition less disposables of valuables. External debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private
nonguaranteed long-term debt.
The countries are Kenya, Zimbabwe, Chile, Mexico, Indonesia, and Thailand. All variables are seasonally adjusted and in annual frequency for the period 1970-2004. The data
are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. This database is
well-acknowledged and extensively used by researchers. The choice of countries and variables
was determined by data availability as well as the theoretical formulation. For uniformity,
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we have included low income countries, lower middle income countries, and upper middle
income countries. With the exception of inflation where levels of the variable are used, all
variables are transformed by logarithm.
By using a multivariate specification, we can allow for a variety of shocks in addition
to inflation shock, which is our focus of interest. However, there is not a complete decomposition of the one-step ahead prediction error into all its components due to underlying
shocks. Instead we identify only inflation shocks. We assume that there is a monetary policy
(inflationary) shock that is orthogonal and normalized to be of variance one.
We smoothen the data series for our cross correlation analysis through the HodrickPrescott (HP) filter. Hodrick and Prescott (1997) assume that an original series qt has a
trend component and a cyclical component. The HP filter gets rid of the trend component
from the data, leaving the cyclical component, which is the part of the data to be analyzed.
The conceptual framework of the HP filter is given as follows: Let qt = τt + ct . The trend
P
component is found by choosing a sequence of points {τt } to solve the problem: min Tt=1 (qt −
P −1 2
(∆ τt+1 )2 , where ∆2 τ is the second derivative of the trend and λ is the penalty
τt )2 + λ Tt=1
attached to the volatility of the trend component. For annual data, λ is assumed to be 100.
Previous research suggest that most economic time series variables are non-stationary.
Ordinary least squares estimation of VARs with integrated variables could lead to coefficients
with non-normal asymptotic distributions, which makes it difficult in carrying out statistical
inferences. However, Sims and Zha (1998) suggests that with the Bayesian method, data
should not be differenced or detrended. The methodology is robust to the presence of nonstationarity and though it does not impose any long-run cointegrating relationship between
the variables, it does not preclude their existence too. As such, we check the stationarity
properties of the data to determine whether to estimate an unrestricted VAR or a vector
error correction model (VECM). We examine the univariate statistical properties of the series
using different unit root tests, with the null hypothesis of non-stationarity, except with the
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Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) test where the null is the stationarity.
Table A.1 gives the results of our univariate unit root tests. We find that the time series
have different orders of integration under different test assumptions for the six countries.
There is enough evidence for unit roots in CONS, INV and DEBT, but the results on INF
are inconclusive and sensitive to the type of test. Given the different orders of integration,
we carry out an unrestricted VAR modeling. Thus, we estimate the VAR using logs of the
variables rather than first differences. The system has two lags, a constant and no time
trends. Our choice of lag length is supported formally by the Bayesian Information Criteria
(BIC), which selects two lags for all countries. Nonetheless, our VAR results are not very
sensitive to changes in the lag specification.1
First, we examine the cross correlations between INF on one hand, and CONS, INV,
DEBT on the other. Using filtered, seasonally adjusted data, the correlation coefficient
between Thailand inflation and real consumption is found to be -0.84. Similarly, we find
negative correlation coefficient of -0.35 between INF and CONS in Indonesia. With the
exception of Zimbabwe, where the correlation coefficient is 0.45, there are negative correlation
coefficients of -0.14, -0.67 and -0.03 between INF and CONS for Mexico, Chile and Kenya
respectively. Overall, these results are consistent with those derived in the previous chapter,
where consumption initially declined by 1.10 percent.
Lag correlation coefficients are good representations of short run effects. Between inflation and real investment, the coefficients are -0.77, -0.48, -0.36, -0.70, -0.54, and -0.25 for
Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, Chile, Kenya and Zimbabwe respectively. Clearly, these correlations are in tune with our theoretical findings. For inflation and real external debt, there
are negative correlations of -0.80, -0.24 and -0.88 in Thailand, Indonesia and Chile. Contrary
to the theoretical predictions, though, there are positive correlations in Mexico, Kenya and
1

For our ordinary VAR estimation, we use lags of 3, 5, 3, 4, 5, and 6 as determined from the Schwarz
Bayesian Criteria for Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, Chile, Kenya, and Zimbabwe respectively.
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Zimbabwe.2 Table A.2 shows the cross correlation between inflation and the variables in the
system up to the third lag.
Our VAR estimates are given in tables A.3 - A.8 in the appendix. The estimated coefficients show that in general inflation has a negative effect on external debt and investment. It
also has a positive effect on consumption in five of the countries in our study. The individual
coefficients, though, do not mean much due to multicollinearity. Besides, since these are
reduced form equations, we will not get much economic information in terms of the overall
effects of inflation on the variables. A convenient way to summarize and interpret the results
in tables A.3 - A.8 is to calculate the moving average representation and get the impulse
response functions.
Thus, next, we track the response of consumption, investment and external debt to
inflation shocks. As outlined earlier, we estimate our VAR with 2 lags. The impulse responses were obtained after pure sign restrictions were imposed. Unlike the traditional VAR
approach, in order to completely identify the system, Uhlig (2005) proposes that sign restrictions be imposed on the impulse response functions. The restrictions imposed by the
identification procedure are primarily based on the optimizing model developed in section
two and are as follows:
Exhibit: Identification

Positive Inflation Shock

CONS

INV

DEBT

INF

-

-

?

+

The exhibit above shows the sign restrictions imposed on the impulse responses in the
first K years after the shock. Since the response of external debt is the main focus of the
study, we leave the main question of interest agnostically open while restricting the signs of
the other variables. We assume that following a positive inflationary shock the response of
2

The cross correlations were not significantly different when we used unflitered data.
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inflation is non-negative, while the responses of investment and consumption are non-positive
for a certain period. The impulse responses shown in the appendix satisfy these restrictions.
The identification scheme uses k = 0, ..., K = 1, i.e. 2 years. The first period corresponds
to the period of the shock. Hence the restrictions are in place for one year after the initial
shock. The bands indicate the slope of the posterior distribution of the impulse responses,
while the upper and lower error bands (16th and 84th percentiles) represent a one-standard
deviation confidence band for these responses. The responses of CONS, DEBT, and INV
to a one standard deviation increase in INF are plotted in the appendix. The vertical axis
measures the annual impact on the variables of interest, while the horizontal axis measures
the years following the shock.
Our empirical results show that, in general, inflation negatively affects consumption,
investment and external debt in the long run, which is consistent with our findings with the
theoretical model discussed in the previous section. In Thailand, for instance in figure B.9, we
find that external debt reacts largely and negatively immediately following an inflation shock.
Even though insignificant three years after the shock, it does not reverse sign. Following the
shock, consumption and investment fall before rising. However, both responses seem to
level off after five periods. In Indonesia (figure B.10), the response of external debt to an
inflationary shock is short-lived. It is significant at the impact year and also at the next,
becoming insignificant thereafter. Consumption has a significant negative response for three
years following the inflation shock but with smaller magnitude. The response of investment
to the shock in Indonesia is significant. However, it reverses sign after one year and is of a
bigger magnitude.
In Mexico (figure B.11), external debt decreases immediately after the shock even though
it does not remain significant for a long time. Consumption reacts negatively and immediately in Mexico immediately following the shock. The impulse response of consumption
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remains significant for all horizons. But the response of investment in Mexico has opposite sign to the predictions of our model. It has a sluggish initial response followed by an
increasing response of a smaller magnitude, and a leveling off thereafter. The response of
external debt to inflation shocks in Chile (figure B.12) is negative, and it does not reverse
sign for all horizons. However, the responses of investment and consumption look less conventional. They decrease after one period and reverse signs thereafter. The initial decrease
in investment, though, exceeds that in consumption.
In one of the least developed countries in our study, Zimbabwe (figure B.13), following
an inflation shock, external debt decreases. Even though the yearly negative impulses persist beyond six years, they are not statistically significant. Investment reacts largely and
negatively immediately, then reverses course within a year, and ultimately starts to decrease
again. The response of consumption mimics that of investment. In Kenya (figure B.14), as
expected, foreign debt responds immediately to an inflation shock. It increases marginally,
though it reverses sign and stays insignificant even after 6 years. Conversely, consumption
starts decreasing immediately after the shock but starts to increase after one year for several
years. A one-time standard deviation shock to inflation has a positive impact on investment.
This is insightful because one expects a negative shock to monetary policy (in this case an
increase in the inflation rate) to be followed by decreases in investment in Kenya.
In the context of our theoretical model, our results are consistent. Furthermore, our theoretical and empirical results are not in accord with the view that superneutrality of money
prevails in an open economy framework with cash-in-advance constraints on consumption
alone. In policy terms, in the face of high inflation, monetary authorities need not pursue an
accommodating policy of higher interest rates. This is because the decrease in consumption
and investment invariably lead to a decline in aggregate demand thereby easing inflationary
pressures. At a minimum, our results imply that reducing inflation will increase consumption and investment, thereby boosting output. Moreover, reducing external debt changes
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the options available to the government for developing their economies. Unanticipated inflation reduces the real value of debt, thereby causing an eventual increase in government
expenditure or a decrease in future taxation.

3.4.1

Robustness Test

The selection of the horizon for which the restrictions hold is ad hoc. Thus our results
must be sensitive to changes in K. For completeness, we check whether the results of the
sign restrictions methodology are robust upon the horizons of the sign restrictions. In the
appendix, figures (B.15) - (B.20), we show the results for K = 2.
The dynamic effects of inflation in Thailand are as follows. Following a shock, in figure
B.15, there is a significant negative effect on consumption for six periods. Investment starts
to fall before reversing course. Inflation also has persistent negative effects on external debt,
though not significant for the most part. The Thailand responses are approximately of the
same size as before. Turning our attention to Indonesia in figure B.16, an inflation shock
provokes an immediate decrease in all the variables under consideration. The magnitudes of
the responses do not differ significantly from earlier ones in the case of K = 1 for the rest
of the countries in our study. Similar results are achieved when the horizon K is increased
further. As a matter of fact, as we move from shorter to longer horizons, the error bands
seem to move up, but our results do not change much for all the countries in our study.
Furthermore, to be less restrictive in terms of identification restrictions, we impose a
sign restriction only on consumption and leave investment and external debt open. This
is because a CIA constraint on consumption establishes firmly that an increase in inflation
leads to reductions in consumption spending. This fact is generally accepted in the monetary
growth literature. The impulse response arising from the imposition of this restriction are
shown in figures (B.21) - (B.26). Clearly, our results do not change significantly, lending
further credence to our empirical evidence. In addition to these robustness checks, we further
82

estimate a standard VAR for comparative purposes only. It must be noted that we do not do
a typical Choleski type estimation, but rather employ generalized impulse response functions.

3.4.2

Standard VAR Approach

In this section we estimate an ordinary VAR as a further econometric check. As outlined
earlier, the traditional VAR approach cannot be invariant to the chosen ordering. In this
section, we apply the concept of generalized impulse response functions (GIRF) to analyze
the impact of inflation shocks to specific equations on each of the variables in the system
(Koop, Pesaran, and Potter, 1996). The GIRF can single out a specific shock without
resorting to ad hoc identifying restrictions. Moreover, The GIRF considers all dynamic
relationships between variables, thereby circumventing the problem of differential impacts
with regards to the different lag structures.
For calculation of the GIRFs, the VAR needs to be written as an infinite moving average
P
representation as: yt = ∞
i=0 Ai εt−i , where Ai is a 4×4 matrix of parameters that is obtained
using the following recursive relations: Ai = Φ1 Ai−1 +Φ2 Ai−2 +...+Φp Ai−p

i = 1, 2, ... with

A0 = Im and Ai = 0 for i < 0. With a shock ε0t , IRy = An ε0t , which is independent of the
’history’ of the process but depends on the composition of shocks ε0t . Assuming the εt has
P
−1
−1
a multivariate normal distribution E(εt | εjt = δj ) = (σ1j , σ2j , ..., σnj )0 σjj
δj =
ej σjj
δj ,
where δj = (σjj )−1/2 denotes one standard error shocks. Hence, the m × 1 GIRF vector of
the effect of a shock in the jth equation at time t on yt+n , ε0t , on the ith variable at horizon
P
An ej
, n = 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., where ej is a 4×1 selection vector with 1
’n’ is given by GIRy,n = √
σjj
as its jth element and 0 elsewhere, and σjj is a one standard deviation (SD) shock. The time
path for the generalized responses measures the effect of one SD shock to the jth equation
at time t on expected values of y at time t + n.
We show our accumulated generalized impulse responses of consumption, investment and
external debt to a one standard deviation innovation in inflation in figures (B.27) to (B.32).
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An innovation of INF leads to significant declines in CONS, INV and DEBT in Thailand.
The INF innovation has persistent negative effects in each instance. These results are consistent with those obtained with the pure sign restrictions method. Results for Indonesia across
the two identification schemes differ only slightly in the INV variable. Although investment
starts rising after one period in the case of the pure sign restrictions estimation, the overall
effect is negative. It must be noted here that the GIRF shown is the cumulative sum of the
impulse responses.
There are slight variations, though, in the estimations for Mexico in figures B.11 and
B.29. Whereas an inflation shock has negative effects on consumption and investment, it
has positive effects on external debt. In the pure sign restrictions approach, external debt
initially declines, then shows mild effects for several periods, remaining positive. In the GIRF
case, it increases following an inflation shock for several periods before it changes course.
The positive effect of inflation on external debt in Mexico is not at all surprising. It must
be recalled that Mexico refused to honor their debt repayment commitments, precipitating
debt crises in the 1980s and 1990s. The results for Chile do not differ significantly in the two
estimations. Once again, we must bear in mind that the GIRFs are accumulated responses.
The results of the two estimations in the low income countries are significantly different.
In Zimbabwe in figure B.13, there is a negative and significant response of consumption to
an inflation shock for at least three periods with the pure sign restrictions approach, whereas
a similar shock produces an insignificant positive response with the GIRFs. The response
of investment to an inflation shock in both estimations is negative. External debt, though,
declines in response to an inflation shock in the GIRF estimation for about three periods,
reversing course thereafter. With the exception of external debt, the results for Kenya in
both estimations are not significantly different. A possible explanation here is that external
debt increases in response to relatively higher domestic output and lower interest rates.
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We also carry out forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) to identify the contributions of the variables in our VAR system. The FEVD is based upon the orthogonalized
impulse response coefficient matrices. The variance decomposition shows the percentage
contribution of inflation shocks to the variance of the k-step ahead forecast errors of the
variables. Variance decompositions provide evidence of the simple existence of a causal relationship between two variables. Thus, it is not uncommon to see each series explain the
importance of its own past values. Here, we discuss the contribution of INF to the 10-step
forecast error variance of consumption, investment and external debt. Overall, it is shown
that the influence of inflation increases moderately as the forecast horizon increases for all
variables in the countries under examination.

3.5

Conclusion

Do monetary policy shocks really affect the overall performance of an economy? This question has received considerable attention from a number of researchers over different time
periods. Yet, there is a lot of disagreement on the real impacts of monetary policy. This
chapter provides new theoretical and empirical evidence on the effects of inflation on macroeconomic variables.
We have estimated a four-variable VAR model of monetary policy shocks using annual
data from Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, Chile, Zimbabwe, and Kenya for the period 1970
-2004. The identification scheme imposes sign restrictions on the responses of some variables
for a number of periods. This approach significantly improves upon previous VAR models for
developing countries. It is shown that inflation shocks have a negative effect on consumption,
foreign debt, and investment. Overall the responses of the macroeconomic variables to the
inflation shock are non-monotonic. The evidence advanced here has its underpinnings in a
cash-in-advance monetary model of a small open developing economy which predicts similar
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results.
The effects of inflation in developing countries certainly needs more attention. Future
extensions to build on the model developed here include evaluating sub-macroeconomic impacts, specifying the theoretical model to introduce stochasticity, increasing the number of
variables in the system, and examining the question of interest with a panel VAR model.
Moreover, two of our ”relatively developed” countries display consistent results (in terms of
theory and empirics) than the two least developed ones. This could be due to the existence of
somewhat better credit markets and production structures. Future research in development
economics would have to take up these issues at length.
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Table A.1: Unit Root Tests
Countries
Thailand

Indonesia

Mexico

Chile

Kenya

Zimbabwe

Variables ADF(1)
ADF(2)
PP
KPSS
INF
0.2524
-2.2364
-0.6385
0.5371**
CONS
-0.8531
1.3527
-3.7113* 0.6929**
INV
-3.3673** 4.9026**
-1.8737
0.6271**
DEBT
-4.6591** -2.9528
-4.6389** 0.6711**
INF
-2.1145
-2.3882
-1.3427
0.2485
CONS
-1.7563 -5.4015** -13.9855** 0.6920**
INV
-1.0436 -3.9854** -7.4562** 0.6374**
DEBT
-1.2232
-0.8536
-0.5921
0.6596**
INF
-0.8490
-1.9560
-1.3279
0.1871
CONS
-2.0608 -5.1458** -3.7064** 0.6967**
INV
-1.0742
-1.9538
-0.9955
0.6550**
DEBT
-2.7855
-2.7752
-6.5872** 0.5135**
INF
-7.1492** -2.2725
-1.0803
0.5629**
CONS
1.5722
-1.9983
1.3380
0.6473**
INV
-0.2923
-1.8494
0.4393
0.6548**
DEBT
-0.1852 -8.0071** -3.2195** 0.6431**
INF
-0.6060
1.2719
-1.6993
0.1882
CONS
-0.5765
-3.4165
-3.5147** 0.7002**
INV
2.2649
0.5446
1.9398
0.4814**
DEBT
-0.5908
-0.1056
-3.9199** 0.5639**
INF
1.8324
0.0773
10.1271
0.5373**
CONS
-4.6936**
0.3672
-3.2943** 0.6255**
INV
-7.0109** -5.5799**
-1.8884
0.2223
DEBT
-6.5521** -0.10771
-1.6815
0.6259**

Notes:
1. ADF(1) and ADF(2) are the test statistics on the lagged variable in the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test
regression with constant, and that with constant and trend respectively. PP and KPSS are known as Phillips
and Perron, and Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin test respectively. The KPSS test differs from the
others in the sense that it tests for the null hypothesis of stationarity of a univariate time series.
2. * and ** denote rejection of the null at 1% and 5% level of significance respectively. The asymptotic 5%
critical values are: ADF test: -2.9571 (with constant), -3.5577 (with constant and trend); PP: -2.9511 (with
constant); KPSS: 0.4630 (with constant).
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Table A.2: Short Run Effects of Inflation
Countries
Thailand

Indonesia

Mexico

Chile

Kenya

Zimbabwe

LAGS
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3

CONS INV DEBT
-0.83 -0.81 -0.82
-0.81 -0.82 -0.81
-0.76 -0.81 -0.78
-0.32 -0.41 -0.19
-0.26 -0.33 -0.13
-0.20 -0.24 -0.06
-0.19 -0.35
0.49
-0.24 -0.34
0.35
-0.29 -0.32
0.19
-0.58 -0.61 -0.81
-0.49 -0.51 -0.72
-0.39 -0.41 -0.62
-0.13 -0.55
0.44
-0.21 -0.55
0.29
-0.27 -0.53
0.15
0.48
-0.19
0.55
0.50
-0.13
0.58
0.52
-0.07
0.61
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Table A.3: VAR Estimates for Thailand
CONS
CONS(-1)
2.3304
[20.8534]
CONS(-2)
-1.3755
[-12.0834]
INF(-1)
-0.0025
[-1.5355]
INF(-2)
0.0015
[0.9164]
INV(-1)
-0.0525
[-2.2339]
INV(-2)
0.0396
[1.6029]
DEBT(-1)
-0.0651
[-3.9212]
DEBT(-2)
0.0886
[6.5815]
C
1.0260
[8.9818]
R-squared
0.9999
Adj. R-Squared
0.9999
Log likelihood
211.104
S.E. equation
0.0004

INF
9.7225
[0.8854]
-10.1846
[-0.9104]
1.7185
[10.5662]
-0.7891
[-4.7488]
-1.1874
[-0.5136]
1.1912
[0.4905]
-0.4691
[-0.2874]
0.5970
[0.4511]
9.7424
[0.8679]
0.9997
0.9996
59.7127
0.0464

INV
1.6150
[8.4932]
-1.7086
[-8.8208]
-0.0174
[-6.2078]
0.0145
[5.0732]
1.6159
[40.3686]
-0.6792
[-16.1515]
-0.1208
[-4.2752]
0.1847
[8.0605]
2.6206
[13.4816]
0.9999
0.9999
193.562
0.0008

DEBT
0.2954
[1.8104]
-0.3186
[-1.9167]
-0.0016
[-0.6617]
0.0083
[3.3980]
0.3521
[10.2516]
-0.2306
[-6.3921]
1.3702
[56.4881]
-0.4358
[-22.1625]
-0.7929
[-4.7535]
1.0000
1.0000
198.609
0.0006

Notes: Sample (adjusted): 1972 - 2004 (Usable observations: 33 after adjustments); t-stats in [ ].
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Table A.4: VAR Estimates for Indonesia
CONS
CONS(-1)
1.6659
[44.4949]
CONS(-2)
-0.7045
[-17.2685]
INF(-1)
-0.0018
[-3.3174]
INF(-2)
0.0015
[2.8690]
INV(-1)
0.0665
[3.9246]
INV(-2)
-0.0357
[-2.2179]
DEBT(-1)
-0.1160
[-15.8499]
DEBT(-2)
0.1140
[22.3129]
C
0.6514
[8.1823]
R-squared
1.0000
Adj. R-Squared
1.0000
Log likelihood
216.219
S.E. equation
0.0004

INF
INV
DEBT
9.5133
-0.3009
0.7990
[1.4270]
[-4.6210]
[9.6954]
-8.7186
-0.1617
-0.7279
[-1.2002]
[2.2786]
[-8.1057]
1.9037
-0.0108
0.0004
[18.6846] [-10.8717] [0.3645]
-0.9722
0.0070
-0.0016
[-10.3081] [7.6743]
[-1.3787]
3.1038
1.4808
-0.0077
[1.0278]
[50.1919] [-0.2082]
-2.8726
-0.4508
0.0150
[-1.0012] [-16.0840] [0.4236]
-1.2881
-0.0662
1.8365
[-0.9881] [-5.2038] [113.948]
0.9131
0.0892
-0.8872
[1.0031]
[10.0365] [-78.8342]
-21.4355
3.4192
-1.1332
[-1.5122] [24.6897] [-6.4665]
0.9996
0.9999
0.9999
0.9995
0.9999
0.9999
45.2118
197.949
190.180
0.0720
0.0007
0.0008

Notes: Sample (adjusted): 1972 - 2004 (Usable observations: 33 after adjustments); t-stats in [ ].
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Table A.5: VAR Estimates for Mexico
CONS
INF
CONS(-1)
0.7627
269.610
[2.2430] [2.0896]
CONS(-2)
0.1865 -273.040
[0.5911] [-2.2797]
INF(-1)
0.0013
1.0600
[3.6199] [7.7283]
INF(-2)
-0.0004
-0.3977
[-1.3503] [-2.9074]
INV(-1)
0.5836 -184.055
[4.6813] [-3.8906]
INV(-2)
-0.4964 170.349
[-5.1186] [4.6292]
DEBT(-1)
-0.0447 29.1317
[-3.7116] [6.3667]
DEBT(-2)
0.0137 -15.3482
[0150]
[-2.9900]
C
-0.1196 140.796
[-0.8568] [2.6578]
R-squared
0.9999
0.9998
Adj. R-Squared 0.9999
0.9998
Log likelihood
196.900
0.9240
S.E. equation
0.0007
0.2759

INV
-3.2111
[-3.6069]
3.0817
[3.7291]
0.0019
[2.0551]
8.63E-06
[0.0091]
3.1606
[9.6827]
-1.9544
[-7.6974]
-0.1149
[-3.6424]
0.0280
[0.7913]
0.3005
[0.8233]
0.9999
0.9999
165.140
0.0019

DEBT
0.4787
[0.3283]
-0.8000
[-0.5910]
-0.0086
[-5.5834]
0.0054
[3.5424]
-1.6012
[-2.9949]
1.6122
[3.8766]
1.7212
[33.2857]
-0.6123
[-10.5561]
6.2844
[10.4970]
0.9999
0.9999
148.856
0.0031

Notes: Sample (adjusted): 1972 - 2004 (Usable observations: 33 after adjustments); t-stats in [ ].
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Table A.6: VAR Estimates for Chile
CONS
INF
CONS(-1)
0.6250
14.3996
[4.7324]
[0.1398]
CONS(-2)
0.1642
80.2744
[1.4973]
[0.9389]
INF(-1)
-0.0005
1.7470
[-5.0979] [22.5808]
INF(-2)
0.0005
-0.9348
[6.2200] [-13.2257]
INV(-1)
0.2938
44.2651
[8.6112]
[1.6644]
INV(-2)
-0.1561
-94.8335
[-4.4478] [-3.4662]
DEBT(-1)
-0.1280
-55.0444
[-4.7970] [-2.6455]
DEBT(-2)
0.1171
33.9419
[4.8676]
[1.8092]
C
3.2723
-1080.50
[7.2760] [-3.0823]
R-squared
0.9999
0.9999
Adj. R-Squared 0.9999
0.9999
Log likelihood
203.166 -16.5665
S.E. equation
0.0006
0.4687

INV
DEBT
-1.7236
2.7317
[-2.9879] [5.7913]
1.3455
-2.4644
[2.8085] [-6.2910]
-0.0007
0.0005
[-1.6789] [1.5704]
0.0008
-0.0004
[2.0448] [-1.4463]
2.0518
-0.6850
[13.7679] [-5.6219]
-0.8340
0.4952
[-5.4398] [-3.9504]
-0.1194
2.1531
[-1.0242] [22.5842]
0.1331
-1.1168
[1.2661] [-12.9928]
5.7339
-4.3676
[2.9188] [-2.7191]
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
154.514
161.157
0.0026
0.0021

Notes: Sample (adjusted): 1972 - 2004 (Usable observations: 33 after adjustments); t-stats in [ ].
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Table A.7: VAR Estimates for Zimbabwe

CONS(-1)
CONS(-2)
INF(-1)
INF(-2)
INV(-1)
INV(-2)
DEBT(-1)
DEBT(-2)
C
R-squared
Adj. R-Squared
Log likelihood
S.E. equation

CONS
INF
1.6995
25.3210
[8.9347]
[1.3384]
-0.6434
-19.3142
[-3.6887] [-1.1133]
-5.63E-05
2.2485
[-0.1395] [56.0109]
1.63E-05
-1.3137
[0.0334] [-27.0680]
0.0084
-21.1159
[0.1485]
[-3.7213]
-0.0281
20.5866
[-0.4947]
[3.6422]
-0.0061
-13.1276
[-0.1205] [-2.5921]
-0.0205
12.4420
[-0.4396]
[2.6749]
-0.4150
-115.086
[-0.9090] [-2.5343]
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
172.171
20.3888
0.0001
0.1529

INV
DEBT
0.2845
-0.3762
[2.7284] [-0.9332]
-0.4033
0.9205
[-4.2178] [2.4901]
-0.0002
0.0002
[-0.9904] [0.2773]
0.0002
-0.0002
[0.9136] [-0.2149]
1.7855
0.1910
[57.0859] [1.5802]
-0.8505
-0.2304
[-27.2998] [-1.9132]
-0.0534
1.7509
[-1.9155] [16.2248]
0.0955
-0.9635
[3.7263] [-9.7208]
3.3715
-8.0610
[13.4690] [-8.3302]
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
192.013
147.392
0.0008
0.0032

Notes: Sample (adjusted): 1972 - 2004 (Usable observations: 33 after adjustments); t-stats in [ ].
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Table A.8: VAR Estimates for Kenya
CONS
CONS(-1)
1.6473
[33.4899]
CONS(-2)
-0.4545
[-7.2545]
INF(-1)
-0.0006
[-4.8704]
INF(-2)
0.0001
[0.9884]
INV(-1)
-0.1516
[-6.3659]
INV(-2)
-0.0972
[-2.7727]
DEBT(-1)
-0.0280
[-2.6826]
DEBT(-2)
-0.0546
[-4.1425]
C
1.8887
[11.1216]
R-squared
1.0000
Adj. R-Squared
0.9999
Log likelihood
229.643
S.E. equation
0.0002

INF
-16.3537
[-2.0241]
5.2035
[0.5055]
1.8826
[80.1829]
-1.0691
[-37.7760]
23.0960
[5.9033]
-13.7562
[-2.3880]
4.6038
[2.6792]
0.8118
[0.3747]
-12.4770
[-0.4472]
0.9998
0.9998
61.2970
0.0442

INV
DEBT
-0.0738
-1.8127
[-0.6921] [-18.8389]
0.6025
1.6426
[4.4335]
[13.4012]
-0.0011
0.0042
[-3.6148] [15.0858]
0.0009
-0.0071
[2.6639] [-21.3048]
1.2998
0.7429
[25.1585] [15.9456]
-0.9560
-0.6900
[-12.5686] [-10.0583]
-0.2410
1.9092
[-10.6234] [93.2938]
0.0054
-0.8531
[0.1919] [-33.0630]
4.7795
2.3460
[12.9749]
[7.0618]
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
204.091
207.500
0.0005
0.0005

Notes: Sample (adjusted): 1972 - 2004 (Usable observations: 33 after adjustments); t-stats in [ ].

101

Appendix B
Figures
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Figure B.1: Time path of the level of employment

Figure B.2: Time path of the stock of debt
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Figure B.3: Time path of consumption

Figure B.4: Time path of the level of capital
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Figure B.5: Time path of labor supply

Figure B.6: Time path of external debt
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Figure B.7: Time path of the level of consumption

Figure B.8: Time path of the stock of capital
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Figure B.9: Impulses with pure sign restrictions (K=1) for Thailand

Figure B.10: Impulses with pure sign restrictions (K=1) for Indonesia
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Figure B.11: Impulses with pure sign restrictions (K=1) for Mexico

Figure B.12: Impulses with pure sign restrictions (K=1) for Chile
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Figure B.13: Impulses with pure sign restrictions (K=1) for Zimbabwe

Figure B.14: Impulses with pure sign restrictions (K=1) for Kenya
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Figure B.15: Impulses with pure sign restrictions (K=2) for Thailand

Figure B.16: Impulses with pure sign restrictions (K=2) for Indonesia
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Figure B.17: Impulses with pure sign restrictions (K=2) for Mexico

Figure B.18: Impulses with pure sign restrictions (K=2) for Chile
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Figure B.19: Impulses with pure sign restrictions (K=2) for Zimbabwe

Figure B.20: Impulses with pure sign restrictions (K=2) for Kenya
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Figure B.21: Impulses with pure sign restriction (on C) for Thailand

Figure B.22: Impulses with pure sign restriction (on C) for Indonesia
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Figure B.23: Impulses with pure sign restriction (on C) for Mexico

Figure B.24: Impulses with pure sign restriction (on C) for Chile
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Figure B.25: Impulses with pure sign restriction (on C) for Zimbabwe

Figure B.26: Impulses with pure sign restriction (on C) for Kenya
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Figure B.27: Generalized Impulses for Thailand

Figure B.28: Generalized Impulses for Indonesia
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Figure B.29: Generalized Impulses for Mexico

Figure B.30: Generalized Impulses for Chile
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Figure B.31: Generalized Impulses for Zimbabwe

Figure B.32: Generalized Impulses for Kenya
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